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RESEARCH SUPPLEMENT

INTERROGATION REPORTS

NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS

NORTH KOREAN 3D INF DIV

NORTH KOREAN 5TH INF DIV



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Allied Translator & Interpreter Section

28 February 1951

RESEARCH SUPPLEMENT
INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 96
NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS
NK 3D INFANTRY DIVISION-NK 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

This report summarizes significant information concerning North Korean defensive tactics and the 3d and 5th Infantry Divisions obtained from on-the-spot interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and deserters and Republic of Korea refugees, translation of captured enemy documents, and other parallel sources.

Recipients are cautioned that this report is based primarily on prisoner of war interrogations and information contained herein is not completely evaluated. Subsequent interrogations will undoubtedly bring to light additional data upon which revision and correction of this material will have to be made in future interrogation reports.

Immediately upon capture, enemy prisoners of war are interrogated briefly by capturing units to obtain front line intelligence. They are then transported to United Nations' prisoner of war enclosures where they receive a detailed interrogation by Advanced ATIS interrogation teams of highly-trained U.S. Army and Air Force interrogators. The resulting individual reports are then delivered by air courier to ATIS Headquarters in TOKYO for collation and dissemination.

The enormous amount of invaluable intelligence information, covering a wide range of vital subjects, disseminated through the medium of ATIS Interrogation Reports may be noted from a perusal of the tabulations following this page, particularly the "Tabular Analysis of Information in ATIS Files."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

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TABULAR ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION IN ATIS FILES

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Figures listed below are tabulation of partial information contained in 35,470 ATIS Interrogations; 110,440 Eighth Army Interrogations; and 17,723 allied intelligence documents as of 28 February 1951.

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e. Organization and Training	2901	1052
f. Posts, Camps and Stations	33947	4615
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h. Unit Identifications	216	182
11. SOVIET ARMY FORCES		
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b. Equipment and Armament	9200	4766
c. Loyalty and Condition	992	124
d. Organization and Training	16597	1101
e. Posts, Camps and Stations	3663	1397
f. Sketches of Fortified Areas	1391	93
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NOTE: *Not all technical subjects are listed in this tabulation.*

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2	14 Feb 47	MANCHURIA, KOREA and North CHINA ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Communications, Equipment, Medical, Sociological.	54	24
3	21 Feb 47	MANCHURIA, KOREA and North CHINA ..... Communications, Defense, Medical, Military Forces, Morale and Propaganda, Social, Airfields, Troop Concentrations.	75	41
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6	17 Mar 47	MANCHURIA, KOREA and CHINA ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Communications, Equipment, Medical, Military Units, Personalities, Soviet Intentions.	64	58
7	21 Mar 47	MANCHURIA, KOREA and KURILES ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Equipment, Identifications, Medical, Military Units, Morale and Propaganda, Personalities, Ships.	58	3
8	8 Apr 47	MANCHURIA and KOREA..... Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treatment, Communications, Identifications, Medical, Military Units, Personalities, Ships.	79	9
9	9 Apr 47	MANCHURIA, KOREA and North CHINA ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Capture and Treatment, Communications, Morale and Propaganda, Ships, Unit or Force.	70	33
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30	18 Nov 47	MANCHURIA and North KOREA ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Communications, Fortifications, Indoctrination, Navy, Political, Ships, Ports, Sociological, Unit or Force.	84	35
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33	2 Jan 48	SAKHALIN ..... Aircraft, Airfields, Political, Railroads, in *Primorskiy Kray* (Maritime Territory), Sociological, Topographic.	113	50
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

MAP NO 542 G-2 GEOGRAPHIC BRANCH, CARTOGRAPHIC SECTION, 24 APR 50

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

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NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS

NORTH KOREAN 3D INF DIV

NORTH KOREAN 5TH INF DIV

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ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 96

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RESEARCH SUPPLEMENT

INTERROGATION REPORTS

Issue No. 96

HIGHLIGHTS

1. NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS: According to PW information, the North Korean Army, in its pre-war training, stressed offensive operations to the virtual exclusion of defensive techniques. Thus, it was an ill-prepared and relatively ineffective instrument of defensive warfare that was spared complete disintegration only by the timely intervention, in greatly superior numbers, of the Chinese Communist Forces. Page 2

The regimental sectors in the main line of resistance are reportedly made up of battalion and company strong-points deployed circularly and in depth around the regimental key positions. According to captured documents, North Korean defensive doctrine teaches that the regiment must be able to withstand strong hostile pressure without abandoning its positions even if completely surrounded. The regiment is apparently the smallest self-sufficient tactical unit in defensive combat. Page 5

In the defense, North Korean artillery allegedly has the mission of harassing and inflicting casualties on hostile reserves in assembly areas and of delaying, dispersing and neutralizing infantry and tank assaults. Purely interdictory missions are not fired, PsW claim. Once a hostile assault on North Korean defensive positions has been averted, it reportedly becomes the primary mission of artillery to support the ensuing counterattack. Page 14

According to PsW, antimechanized defense in the North Korean Army is a combined function of artillery, antitank weapons, and of organic combat engineer detachments. Their reports reflect that in offensive as well as in defensive combat rifle regiments form antitank teams. These antitank teams are purportedly deployed well to the rear of the main formation as a mobile antitank defense force. Page 16

According to captured documents, the enemy's defensive doctrine holds that the control by fire of all low ground from neighboring dominating terrain is of paramount importance in organizing defensive positions in mountainous areas, since it is the effective control of the valleys that decides the outcome of such a defense. The North Korean Army, consequently, constructs its strong-points near military crests from which their observed fire effectively sweeps and controls the low ground below. Page 23

2. DIVISIONAL HISTORIES: A fairly detailed and accurate account of the organization, training and combat history of the North Korean 3rd and 5th Infantry Divisions has been compiled from PW information. Pages 26 and 37

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RESEARCH SUPPLEMENT

INTERROGATION REPORTS

Issue No. 96

This report summarizes significant information concerning North Korean Forces obtained by U.S. Army and FEAF intelligence agencies operating in the Korean battle area. Primary sources of information for this report include the following:

(1) On-the-spot interrogation by highly-trained interrogators of North Korean and Chinese Communist PsW and deserters, Republic of KOREA (ROK) refugees and military personnel, and members of the UN Armed Forces.

(2) Translations by ATIS of captured enemy documents, periodicals, diaries, etc.

(3) Other parallel sources when appropriate.

(4) In addition, so as to provide a certain amount of background material and to present the sometimes fragmentary interrogation information in its proper setting, material culled from other sources than those referred to above has been utilized. Whenever this has been done the source has been clearly identified in the text.

Using agencies, when evaluating information in this report stemming from interrogation reports, should take the following factors into consideration:

(1) As a source of detailed, authentic information about the enemy, interrogations are of inestimable value when properly analyzed and evaluated on a continuing basis. Information contained in this report is not considered final and will be modified or changed in future publications as additional material becomes available.

(2) Individual interrogation reports upon which this study is based have already been reproduced and disseminated separately. Care must be exercised, therefore, to ascertain that this collated summary is not accepted as confirmation of these individual interrogations.

When, in the text of this report, a locale is mentioned initially, the place name is given first followed by the geographic coordinates (coordinates used are those contained in Gazetteer to Maps of KOREA, Map Series AMS L551, dated September 1944). Thereafter the name alone is used. Place names marked with an asterisk (*) could not be accurately located.

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NORTH KOREAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS

1. GENERAL

The following analysis based on information obtained from 64 PW interrogation reports and the translation of 12 captured documents, was prepared to furnish using agencies with an insight into the defensive tactics utilized to date by North Korean commanders against UN troops in KOREA. Several of the documents used as source material contain excellent, though academic, information on enemy defensive doctrine. However, when analyzed in the light of available PW interrogations, it has not been possible in many instances to corroborate that these theoretical concepts were actually employed in the field. Therefore, a clear distinction has been made between PW and documentary sources so that proper evaluation of the material may be made. In cases where documentary information alone is used, PW reports simply have not indicated whether or not such procedures have actually been carried out under field conditions. Furthermore, the majority of the information available pertains to the period prior to the intervention of the CCF. It is still too early to estimate, on the basis of PW interrogation reports, the modifications on North Korean defensive tactics engendered by their cooperation with and/or subordination to the CCF.

According to PW information, the North Korean Army, in its pre-war training, stressed offensive operations to the virtual exclusion of defensive techniques. Thus, it was an ill-prepared and relatively ineffective instrument of defensive warfare that was spared complete disintegration only by the timely intervention, in greatly superior numbers, of the Chinese Communist Forces.

While North Korean defensive doctrine, outlined in captured enemy documents, clearly reflects its Soviet origin, this analogy cannot be carried too far, as field conditions imposed certain modifications on the enemy's defensive pattern. Nonetheless, PW reports indicate that in the North Korean as in the Soviet Army the lack of flexibility granted individual commanders, particularly at lower levels, has predicated an adherence to certain preconceived tactical dispositions and maneuvers. This strong degree of command inflexibility probably grows out of the reported tendency to reduce the effect on over-all success or failure in battle of young and insufficiently experienced officers and to concentrate command responsibility in the hands of the senior commander who is accorded broad discretionary powers. A summary analysis of standard North Korean tactics in the defense reveals the following outstanding characteristics:

a. The main defensive position is allegedly comprised of self-sufficient islands of resistance capable of all-around defense even when completely isolated from neighboring forces. Reports indicate furthermore that

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supporting weapons generally fire under decentralized control. However, reserve forces designed to deliver decisive counterattacks and certain special antitank and engineer teams apparently remain under the direct control of the senior commander. (1)

b. In defensive as well as offensive situations the artillery battery is said by PsW to be the normal firing unit, although instances of occasional massed fire by artillery battalions have come to light. In the defense, according to captured documents, North Korean artillery has the primary mission of delaying hostile attacks by engaging the attacker at extreme ranges, thus forcing him to deploy prematurely. As a secondary role, enemy artillery allegedly attempts to separate tanks from infantry for piecemeal annihilation. (2)

c. North Korean defensive doctrine stresses that the strength of a defensive position lies in the effective coordination of all types of fire with antitank defenses and obstacles and in the skillful organization of the ground. Lack of proper attention to detail in the preparation and implementation of a defense plan is, therefore, considered as a severe military offense punishable by death. (3)

d. Dummy positions and emplacements and false defenses are allegedly constructed whenever time permits in order to mislead UN air and ground reconnaissance and attacking forces. (4)

e. Personnel and antitank obstacles are purportedly designed to channelize hostile attacks into pre-registered concentrations of fire from antitank weapons and supporting artillery. (5)

f. Due to the superiority of the UN air arm, camouflage and other measures of passive defense seem to receive great stress in the North Korean Army. Compelled by necessity, the North Koreans apparently have become masters in the art of camouflage and concealment. In effecting nearly complete concealment from aerial observation, the North Koreans have displayed considerable inventiveness and ingenuity in utilizing local materials and adapting them to their purposes. (6)

g. The strength of reserve forces in defensive combat appears to be highly variable. PsW reveal that inasmuch as the bulk of the effective ground force is normally committed at the main line of resistance, the reserve is as a rule limited to approximately one-sixth of the total combat strength. (7)

h. North Korean defensive doctrine holds that only a well-timed and determined counterattack can achieve eventual

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(1) TIS 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.
(2) TIS 771, 1595, 1607; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200494.
(3) ENEMY DOC #200117, 200371, 200494, 200758.
(4) TIS 771; ENEMY DOC #200117.
(5) TIS 1420; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200229, 200494.
(6) TIS 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.
(7) TIS 1951; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200188.

victory in a defensive situation. Commanders of smaller subordinate units are therefore encouraged to launch continuous small-scale counterattacks against penetrations in their sector; but both PW reports and captured documents indicate that the final and decisive assault utilizing all available reserves is executed under the direct control of the senior commander. (8)

i. According to enemy documents, it is a characteristic feature of North Korean military doctrine that a commander is expected to accomplish his mission even under the most adverse circumstances, for instance when threatened by envelopment or when actually enveloped. In fact, it is maintained that envelopment results from poorly executed tactical manuevers indicative of unsuccessful leadership in combat. Consequently, more emphasis is reportedly laid on how to avoid encirclement than on combat from encirclement. As in all other types of combat, PsW state, disengagement may only be authorized by the senior commander. (9)

2. DEFENSIVE TACTICS OF NORTH KOREAN INFANTRY UNITS

A. Frontages and Depth

The depth of a North Korean rifle unit in defense seems to be highly variable. PW reports indicate that in a defensive situation the regimental rear area may extend up to 6 miles in depth (from the MLR) and that of a division up to 12 miles. According to captured documents, a battalion of the North Korean Army in the defense normally occupies an area about 2,000 yd wide and from 1,500 yd to 2,000 yd deep. However, PsW state that in the difficult mountainous terrain of KOREA, the battalion may actually occupy a front up to 3½ miles in width. The actual width of a unit's sector is, of course, determined by the terrain configuration and its tactical mission, with the smallest defensive sector assigned to the unit that is exposed to the main hostile effort.

In depth, the defenses of a rifle unit are allegedly organized into three belts corresponding to the outpost line, the security line, and the main line of resistance. (See Sketch 1)

The outpost line is reportedly located 6 to 8 miles in front of the main line of resistance, according to captured documents, and is designed to harass and delay the hostile attack. Comprised of hasty positions manned by forward detachments, this defensive belt allegedly may be omitted entirely at the discretion of the senior commander.

In a division defensive sector, one of the battalions is reportedly deployed 1 to 1½ miles in front of the main line of resistance to form the security line. This line is said to be comprised of a number of individual strongpoints, protected by a system of obstacles,

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(8) TIS 980; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200371, 200494.
(9) ENEMY DOC #200097, 200117.



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MATERIAL OBTAINED FROM ENEMY DOCUMENTS

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and receives fire support from the main line of resistance. The security line is allegedly designed to prevent surprise attacks and to act as a reconnaissance screen. It reaches its greatest depth and strength in front of the main position.

The main line of resistance, it is reported, has a depth of from 3 to 4 miles and is divided into regimental and battalion sectors which consist of a number of strong-points which, protected by obstacles, afford all-around defense even when isolated. Gaps that can be opened and closed easily are retained in the system of obstacles to allow for counterattacks. (10)

B. Distribution of Rifle Units in the Defense

The regimental sectors in the main line of resistance are reportedly made up of battalion and company strong-points deployed circularly and in depth around the regimental key positions. (See following page, Sketch 2) According to captured documents, North Korean defensive doctrine teaches that the regiment must be able to withstand strong hostile pressure without abandoning its positions even if completely surrounded. The regiment is apparently the smallest self-sufficient tactical unit in defensive combat. Battalion strong-points within the regimental sector are said to be circular in shape to provide all-around protection with fire concentrations on the flanks and in critical sectors. When a regiment holds an exposed flank, PsW state, it is the usual procedure to echelon the battalions in depth and to concentrate reserves near the open flank. (11)

C. Organization of Ground

North Korean commanders reportedly realize the importance of engineer defensive works, in conjunction with natural obstacles, to secure strong-points, channelize hostile attacks, and protect troops and weapons. Consequently, troops are allegedly enjoined to dig defensive works uninterruptedly and to camouflage them adequately against observation from the air. According to a captured enemy field order, unit commanders are held personally responsible, not only for the adequacy of defense plans, particularly as regards to preparation of the ground, but also for the implementation of these plans. In occupying a new position, priority is reportedly given to the construction of gun emplacements and fortifications. If time permits, dummy strong-points may also be prepared to confuse UN reconnaissance patrols and to divert attacks. The prosecution of an essentially offensive type of warfare by the North Korean Army until the early part of August appears to have produced a decided laxity among defending North Korean troops in promptly protecting weapons and equipment and in adequately protecting themselves from increasingly effective UN artillery and aircraft. To correct this situation, the following directive was published by the 6th North Korean Division on 24 August 1950: "As soon as a unit arrives at its objective, it must be

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(10) TIS 1468, 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200131.
(11) TIS 1468, 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.

strengthened immediately and complete its engineering works in order to prevent damage and casualties from enemy shelling and bombing. This practice must be thoroughly indoctrinated in all troops and commanders. More than 8 per cent of those wounded in previous battles were hit by shrapnel. This proves that our engineering duty was neglected. Now it is rare to see even an engineer shovel which all troops should have in their possession at all times. Such conditions not only encourage careless handling of equipment but will result in needless sacrifice of valuable troops. In future battles unit commanders will be held responsible for any losses due to neglect of engineering works." (12)

D. Fire Plan

Preparation of an adequate fire plan is said to be a command function. In regiments and lower units the commander himself assigns targets to all organic supporting weapons; mortars, however, are included in the artillery fire plan drawn up by the artillery officer. In view of the enemy's preference for decentralized defense, supporting weapons generally fire under decentralized control, so that under normal conditions each rifle regiment is supported by a battalion of artillery from division. North Korean rifle companies are reportedly reinforced with one platoon from the battalion heavy machine gun company. Alternate positions for each weapon are allegedly selected and surveyed, when a position is first occupied, but are generally not prepared in advance. Although North Korean military doctrine specifies that gun emplacements must be deployed in depth, field reports indicate that in reality weapons displace only laterally. According to enemy PsW, Allied air superiority has caused North Korean commanders to keep crew-served weapons concealed during the day at some distance behind the front and to move them up into their primary firing positions after the fall of darkness. Prisoners state that supporting weapons are generally used to cover engineer obstacles, mine fields and potential routes of approach of an attacking force and to support with flanking fire neighboring units exposed to the attacker's main effort. Captured enemy documents specify that artillery and mortars have the primary mission of annihilating hostile tanks and engaging enemy forces at extreme ranges so as to delay them and force them to deploy. Intermediate ground between strong-points is allegedly covered by flanking fire from automatic weapons and artillery. In addition, this ground is secured by land mines and obstacles and by some infantry detachments armed with automatic and semi-automatic weapons. (13)

E. Reserves

In the North Korean Army, reserves appear to vary greatly in strength and composition in accordance with the counterattack potential of each situation and with the need for larger or smaller mobile forces. According to captured documents, North Korean military doctrine

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(12) TIS 950, 1951; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200494, 200758.
(13) TIS 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.

TYPICAL DEFENSIVE PERIMETER OF A RIFLE COMPANY



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REF: EN DOC 200117, 201314

SKETCH 2

teaches that only an all-out and decisive counterattack can bring about eventual victory. Piecemeal counterattacks against localized penetrations of the main line are reportedly directed by subordinate commanders, but the senior commander himself conducts the final all-out effort in which all available reserves and mobile formations are committed. Invariably in the Korean War, UN offensives are met by determined and repeated counterattacks launched under the protective fire of all available supporting weapons.

As a rule, the main force of a combat unit is purportedly committed at the main line of resistance and not more than approximately one-sixth of the effective combat strength is held in the rear as a general reserve. In a defensive situation along the NAKTONG River, for instance, a submachine gun company reinforced by an antitank company constituted the entire reserve of a rifle regiment. A better example is perhaps afforded by the 26th North Korean Brigade; this unit, according to some of its captured members, was charged with the defense of a sector along the 38th Parallel against advancing United Nations Forces. Of the four heavy weapons battalions and one rifle battalion that allegedly comprised the effective combat force of the brigade, the infantry battalion, representing one-fifth of the total strength of the brigade, was held in reserve. Yet other reports reveal that very large infantry reserves reinforced with combat engineers, antitank weapons, artillery and tanks may be assembled at times when they can be expected to deal a decisive blow against the attacker's flanks or rear. If armored elements are available to the North Koreans, they are ordinarily concentrated in reserve assembly areas to be employed in the counterattack, although one informant states that at times tanks are dug in to fire artillery or antitank missions. In a defensive situation on the east bank of the NAKTONG River, for example, three tanks were dug in as far as the top of the treads and camouflaged with branches and grass.

Interrogation reports indicate that reserves are as a rule assembled near road junctions in strong positions capable of all-around defense. According to captured documents, North Korean military doctrine cautions commanders not to commit their reserves too early in order not to expend them against purely diversionary attacks. This tendency to inculcate combat leaders with an over-cautious attitude, coupled with the comparatively low mobility and the limited size of his reserves, allegedly has at times been instrumental in dooming North Korean defensive efforts to failure. (14)

F. Defensive Field Order

After completing his initial reconnaissance of a new defensive position, the senior commander purportedly draws up a defense plan which follows the standard format of a North Korean field order. Reports disclose that such an order consists of seven paragraphs containing the following: the first paragraph outlines the enemy

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(14) TIS 1951; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200188.

situation as revealed through reconnaissance and other intelligence sources; in the second paragraph the commander enumerates briefly the North Korean units participating in the operation to include the mission of each unit and boundaries between adjacent units; the third paragraph reportedly contains the commander's decision; in the fourth paragraph the commander assigns specific missions to subordinate units; the fifth paragraph deals with the mission of artillery and other supporting units; the sixth paragraph gives the location of the commander's command and observation posts and the direction of the main axis of communication; and the last paragraph directs when the initial report is to be submitted and specifies the frequency of subsequent reports. A somewhat abbreviated field order published by the 6th North Korean Division Artillery Commander on 12 August 1950 well exemplifies this general pattern:

"1. The U.S. 29th Regimental Combat Team, 24th and 27th Regiments of the 25th Division, and approximately a regiment of ROK troops have been seen moving in front of the 6th Division line.

"a. Between PAEDUN-NI (35°04'N-128°22'E) and KOSONG (34°58'N-128°20'E) there is a regiment equipped with five tanks, 11 artillery pieces, and 30 vehicles. This regiment penetrated into KOSONG yesterday, reaching a point 3 km from SACH'ON (35°04'N-128°06'E) after a sustained advance.

"b. A reinforced regiment with 10 tanks and four armored cars has advanced toward CHINDONG-NI (35°06'N-128°30'E), MUCH'ON-NI (35°38'N-127°54'E), and SANGOK-NI* and a unit of unknown strength has been advancing toward CHUNGAM-NI (35°16'N-128°20'E), MUCH'ON-NI and SANGOK-NI* in an attempt to join forces with two battalions which have been reinforced with three tanks at the MUCH'ON-NI line. Together these units are trying to advance to CHINJU (35°12'N-128°04'E).

"2. a. Two battalions of a mechanized regiment directly attached to corps and the 2d Battalion, 15th Regiment, will encircle and annihilate the enemy by frontal and flank attack. The enemy is attempting to advance toward SACH'ON through the Sach'on - Kosong line.

"b. The 13th Regiment will destroy the remainder of the enemy at the Palsan (35°08'N-128°20'E) line and will then divert the offensive toward the Much'on line to SANGCH'ON (35°22'N-127°50'E) and will destroy the enemy advancing toward CHINJU by a rear and flank attack.

"c. The Training Battalion and 2d Battalion, 13th Regiment, with artillery support, will stop the enemy from advancing toward CHINJU... and at the same time will counterattack and destroy the enemy by frontal attack.

"3. Three artillery pieces from the 76mm Gun Battery of the 15th Regiment will be attached to the 2d Battalion, 15th Regiment.

"4. The Artillery Battery of the 15th Regiment will be responsible for the tactical organization of the guns of the 2d Battalion and will also direct their fire.

"5. My position is SANGMYONG-DONG*.

"6. Report immediately after preparatory firing. Thereafter reports will be rendered once every hour."

All subordinate commanders are allegedly expected to familiarize themselves thoroughly with the defense plan. Laxity in the formulation of a defense plan on the part of commanders at all levels is considered a serious military offense punishable by death, as the following order, promulgated by the North Korean Army High Command in August 1950, reveals: "... Officers who do not formulate a suitable counter-defense plan for their subordinate units and troops will be executed as criminals by a firing squad before officers of their own unit." (15)

G. Conduct of Defense

According to captured enemy documents, the initial shock of an attack on North Korean defensive positions is purportedly absorbed by the security line; the battalion holding this intermediate ground attempts to force the attacking elements to deploy prematurely and to lure them into mine fields and into automatic and artillery fire from the main line. When the pressure becomes too strong, the senior commander gives orders for the security line to fall back on the main line of resistance. As a rule, supporting weapons cover this retreat and engage enemy troops to delay them and to inflict casualties. Maximum fire power is reportedly displayed by supporting weapons when UN forces approach to within 400 yd of the main line, with primary emphasis on separating tanks from the accompanying infantry. According to both documents and PsW, the North Korean Army employs submachine gun units in concert with rifle units to bring attacking forces under cross fire and to execute surprise counter-attacks against the exposed flank of a hostile attack. Under such circumstances, North Korean defensive doctrine (as outlined in captured documents) provides that the submachine gun unit should be separated from the supported rifle unit by a distance of approximately 150 yd. If UN troops succeed in breaching the main defenses, PsW state, all available fire power is concentrated on them from the flanks and depth of the defensive position and reserves may be committed for a piecemeal or concerted counter-attack. Part of the supporting artillery and mortars are directed against hostile elements that have penetrated through the main line of defense, PsW reveal, whereas the remaining artillery and mortars fire interdictory missions and engage reserves to contain the attack and to prevent reinforcements from reaching the breakthrough area. After an attack has been repulsed, commanders at all levels reportedly check their positions, replenish their ammunition and other supplies, and evacuate casualties. However, enemy prisoners manifest that in the North Korean Army tactical considerations take precedence

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(15) ENEMY DOC #200117, 200371.

over the evacuation of dead and wounded; medical attention is given to casualties only after the conclusion of an engagement. It is reported that in the defense casualties are deliberately neglected until lost ground has been regained and the situation has been satisfactorily stabilized. (16)

H. Withdrawal and Retreat

Enemy documents reveal that North Korean officers and troops alike are directed to hold their ground at all cost unless ordered to retreat by competent authority and are instructed to commit suicide rather than to surrender to United Nation Forces. To persuasive propaganda depicting UN troops as barbaric murderers who kill all prisoners was added the direct threat of execution to hold down the desertion rate and to prevent retreat, notably among the demoralized and ill-trained replacements conscripted south of the 38th Parallel. Many prisoners relate that their squad and platoon leaders brandished a pistol and threatened to kill them should they attempt to surrender. Others purport that in combat units composed overwhelmingly of recent ROK draftees, special guards were posted right behind the forward echelon of troops with explicit orders to shoot all deserters. Unit cultural officers, too, seem to play an important role in preventing desertion; they collect surrender leaflets immediately after they are dropped and mete out severe punishment to all personnel found in possession of such a document. But in spite of all precautions, the general demoralization of North Korean troops conditioned by hunger, defeat, continual aerial pounding, and the wholesale influx of untrained replacements recruited south of the 38th Parallel affected so adversely the enemy's will to resist that the communist dictator of North KOREA, KIM Il Sung, found it necessary in August 1950 to issue the following directive:

"1. No unit or unit commander is allowed to retreat even one step from his occupied area or position.

"2. All cowards and deserters will be executed regardless of rank.

"3. The Front Headquarters Commander, corps commanders, and the commanders of subordinate units should court-martial those who leave their battle positions and abandon their weapons without permission...

"4. Those division and regimental commanders who retreat and lose their weapons without their superior's permission will be divested of their office and court-martialed by the Front Headquarters Commander who is hereby granted that power. The court-martial decision and its execution will be ratified by me." (17)

3. HASTY AND DELIBERATE DEFENSES

Since the armed forces of the enemy had been geared primarily to offensive warfare in anticipation of an easy

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(16) TIS 880, 939; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200494.
(17) TIS 711, 1468; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200467, 200494, 200622, 200758.

victory, not much stress was laid on defensive preparations of a more permanent nature until the tide of battle began to turn against the communist aggressor. Consequently, in the basic training phase, the indoctrination of North Korean troops in defensive measures was almost completely neglected and it was not until the full weight of UN air superiority and superior fire-power was brought to bear on the enemy and his offensive drive was stalled in all sectors, that North Korean commanders found it necessary to instill in their troops a consciousness of the value of hasty defenses and of passive air defense measures in reducing casualty rates and conserving irreplaceable materiel.

Hasty defenses in the North Korean Army apparently follow the universal pattern with particular emphasis on the extensive employment of land mines. According to captured documents, North Korean military doctrine teaches that artificial obstacles and mine fields must tie in closely with natural obstacles and barriers and must protect in particular the main line of resistance and intervening areas between strong-points, antitank and antiaircraft weapons and assembly areas for tank and reserve forces. The closely-knit system of natural and artificial obstacles protecting defensive positions of the enemy is reportedly designed to channelize hostile armored thrusts and infantry assaults into previously-registered concentrations of antitank weapons and artillery. Reports indicate that the senior commander himself is responsible for the construction of engineer obstacles and mine fields.

Permanent defenses were ostensibly not encountered until the tide of war began to turn against the North Korean invader in the fall of 1950. In fear of potential landings by UN Forces, the communist government in P'YONG-YANG allegedly commissioned a Defense Installation Bureau with the mission of erecting permanent and semi-permanent defenses against the imminent United Nations' counter-offensive. The bureau employed only a comparatively small number of North Korean technicians under the command of a senior colonel, according to an officer who was assigned to this organization, and accomplished its mission by conscripting between 10,000 and 15,000 ROK civilians as common laborers. In organizing their permanent defenses, the North Koreans have displayed an appreciation of the tactical importance of controlling dominating terrain features; consequently, pillboxes, trenches and gun emplacements are as a rule constructed near military crests so that fire from these positions sweep and control the valleys and roads below, which may be additionally secured by road blocks, mine fields and other obstacles. Although some reports mention pillboxes, most permanent firing positions constructed by the North Korean Army appear to have been of the earth-and-timber type. According to enemy prisoners, such pillboxes measure approximately 16 ft in length, 13 ft in width and extend about 3 ft above the ground; each pillbox reportedly has two 30-inch by 12-inch apertures. The average 200-yd distance between pillboxes, which are said to be usually deployed on a straight or slightly curved line providing little security in depth, is allegedly connected by a communication trench. North Korean shelter trenches, according to PW interrogation reports, are

approximately 3½ ft wide and 4 or 5 ft deep; firing points are dug at suitable intervals, usually where the trench changes direction. Air raid shelters of unknown depth with a 4- or 5-ft thick roof constructed of layers of logs, gravel and earth are allegedly found at intervals along shelter trenches.

Semi-permanent defensive positions of a rather characteristic nature have been reported on the shore of WONSAN (39°10'N-127°26'E) Bay to the north of the city. (See Sketch No. 3) The positions, designed to protect the shallow beaches in that area from Allied landings, were purportedly manned by the 1st Battalion of the 563d North Korean Army Unit. A captured member of this unit relates that the battalion prepared defenses on the forward slopes of three 200-ft high hills situated approximately 1½ miles inland from the bay shore. The battalion command post was established on the right flank of the position behind the 1st Company strong-point, and the battalion forward ammunition dump was set up on a fourth small hill between the positions of the 2d and 3d Companies. As a security line for the battalion positions, and perhaps as a tank obstacle, the battalion dug a 7½-mile long trench between the hills and the bay, a little more than 300 yd from shore, and laid a mine field in front of the trench. The efficacy of these preparations remains unknown, of course, since WONSAN fell to an attack by land and not to an amphibious assault as had been anticipated.

North Korean combat in a permanently fortified zone apparently conforms to universally adopted tactics. According to captured enemy documents, hostile assault teams attempting to neutralize North Korean pillboxes become the primary targets of all supporting weapons. If such teams by-pass to the rear of permanent emplacements, the emplaced weapons are moved out into the open and continue to fire from open positions. Should a pillbox be neutralized, the defensive system is reorganized and the senior commander is informed promptly. As soon as feasible, counter-neutralization teams are then sent out to recapture the lost position. (18)

4. EMPLOYMENT OF HEAVY MACHINE GUNS IN THE DEFENSE

It is normal practice in the North Korean Army, PW reports indicate, to employ the battalion heavy machine-gun company under decentralized control by attaching one platoon to each rifle company assigned to the defense of an area on the main line of resistance; but one platoon of heavy machine guns generally remains with the battalion command post to fire security and antiaircraft missions. Under certain conditions, however, when terrain features or obstacles tend to channelize hostile attacks, the entire company, under centralized fire control, may allegedly be attached to the rifle company exposed to the main effort of the attacking forces.

Enemy commanders reportedly prefer to emplace their heavy machine guns near the flank to permit oblique fire

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(18) TIS 950, 1369, 1663, 1667, 1754, 1803, 1837, 1951, 1986; ENEMY DOC #200117, 200494.

NK DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NORTH OF WONSAN



SKETCH PREPARED BY ATIS - GHQ FEC FROM MATERIAL
OBTAINED FROM TWO PsW
REF: TIS 1837, 1844

SKETCH 3

along the front and adequate fire coverage of obstacles; but, according to captured documents, the guns must be far enough behind the infantry positions to avoid simultaneous annihilation. Primary and alternate firing positions are allegedly interconnected by a trench. When necessary, interrogation reports reveal, several security troops armed with rifles or submachine guns may be attached to each heavy machine gun emplaced away from the main body.

Like other supporting weapons, machine guns reportedly fire from alternate positions to cover the security outposts and shift to primary positions when the security line falls back on the main line of resistance. According to available reports, all guns are controlled centrally by the platoon leader, who from his observation post determines numerical target designations and the azimuth and range; in this manner, all guns of the platoon fire first at one target and, upon its annihilation, shift in unison to another. (19)

5. EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN THE DEFENSE

Under normal circumstances mortar firing positions are allegedly established at the base of a reverse slope. PsW state that the mortar base plate is usually dug in from 12 to 15 inches; but no adequate security from counterbattery fire or aircraft is apparently provided for the crew or ammunition. A part of each mortar's basic load is stacked up a few feet to the rear of the mortar position, it is reported, while the remainder of the ammunition load stays on the ammunition trucks, which, depending on the terrain, are dispersed some 200 yd to the rear under trees or some other cover providing natural concealment. In addition, the trucks are reportedly covered with camouflage nets intertwined with grass or fresh branches. In fact, no mortar position was ever occupied, one PW relates, that did not provide nearby natural concealment. In a company, mortars are normally deployed on a straight or slightly curved front covering a distance of about 65 yd, PsW reveal, and are not staggered in depth to any appreciable degree. In order to furnish effective fire support to the security outposts, mortars may be employed forward of the main line, it is reported, but fall back on their basic positions simultaneously with the withdrawal of the security outposts to the main line of resistance.

The mortar fire plan is purportedly drawn up by the regimental artillery commander and is integrated into that of the supporting artillery. Although North Korean tactical doctrine emphatically favors centralized control of mortars in deference to Soviet tactical precepts, available evidence from the Korean War seems to indicate that decentralized fire by mortar companies was more widespread.

In addition to firing normal antipersonnel, counterbattery and harassing missions, mortars in the North Korean

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(19) TIS 203, 500; ENEMY DOC #200117.

Army allegedly have the primary mission in combat of attacking and separating hostile tanks and infantry, of engaging attacking infantry at extreme ranges in order to force early deployment and delays, of registering on assembly and reserve areas, and of engaging and containing penetrations through the main line of resistance. After receiving counterbattery fire, North Korean mortars reportedly displace laterally to alternate positions over a distance of approximately 450 yd; enemy mortar crews affirm that such displacement is always lateral and never in depth. The North Koreans have displayed a reluctance to fire mortars during daylight hours because of the constant danger of Allied air attacks; during daytime, heavy weapons are consequently concealed in the rear and are moved up only after dark for their nightly firing missions. One PW claims that mortars in the North Korean Army generally do not attempt massed fire. Only on one occasion, he states, when his unit was called on to support his division's crossing of the NAKTONG River, did the rate of fire exceed one round per minute; at that time his mortar crew allegedly expended 120 rounds of ammunition in one hour. Enemy mortars reportedly continue their supporting fire as long as they do not endanger their own troops.

The same prisoner describes the North Korean method of adjusting mortar fire as follows: "Initial data for direction are obtained by compass. The range is estimated. The direction of fire is telephoned to the mortar positions as a base azimuth. Range is converted to elevation setting by a firing chart kept by the company commander... who is the only one to carry such a chart. The commander adjusts fire and gives commands based on calculations made with the mil-relation formula. This adjustment is made with the base piece, i.e. the piece located on the left flank of the mortar position. All pieces follow commands and are brought in on fire for effect." (20)

6. ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE

In the defense, North Korean artillery allegedly has the mission of harassing and inflicting casualties on hostile reserves in assembly areas and of delaying, dispersing and neutralizing infantry and tank assaults. Purely interdictory missions are not fired, PsW claim.

Once a hostile assault on North Korean defensive positions has been averted, it reportedly becomes the primary mission of artillery to support the ensuing counterattack. In preparation for a counterattack, enemy prisoners indicate that massed fire of artillery units not to exceed battalion size is employed, during which all guns concentrate on previously zeroed-in targets specified in the artillery fire plan. Such a barrage usually lasts for 30 minutes, but is lifted when the infantry approaches to within 250 yd of the barrage line. While captured documents reveal that the North Korean

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(20) TIS 1093, 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.

fire control system envisages massed fire of the entire division artillery, PsW allege that by virtue of the inadequacy of communications in the North Korean Army, massed fire was never employed on larger than battalion scale and that the normal firing unit is the artillery battery. As an example of the limitations imposed on artillery units in the field by impaired and insufficient signal communications, the captured Artillery Commander of the 13th North Korean Division relates that, although the artillery regiment was committed originally with its full complement of signal equipment (namely three radios per battery and four per battalion headquarters), lack of maintenance and operation by ill-trained replacements wreaked such havoc with it that by the time of his capture on 22 August 1950 only four operable radios remained in the entire regiment. These were used in the fire control net as an alternate means of communications to wire, a critical shortage of which also existed. So critical, in fact, was the supply of all types of signal equipment, as evidenced by available reports, that contact with supported rifle units had to be maintained by liaison officers who relayed firing instructions to the artillery via messengers. Prisoners indicate that even at the beginning of the war certain shortages existed, notably in wireless equipment, and that by the middle of August the situation deteriorated to such a degree that the inadequacy of signal equipment and of logistical support in general could be characterized as the two most serious intrinsic limiting factors of North Korean combat operations, defensive as well as offensive.

Artillery pieces in the North Korean Army are usually emplaced under the cover of darkness or during periods of low visibility. It is normal to deploy guns by batteries, PsW claim, either in a straight or slightly curved line with intervals of approximately 25 yd between pieces. At times, however, flat "W" formations have also been employed, an artillery officer contends. In defensive situations gun pits 3 to 4 ft deep are allegedly dug with the earth banked to the front. In order to permit complete concealment of gun, crew and ammunition, covered shelters are constructed on either side of the main emplacement when time permits. The shelter on the right of the main emplacement reportedly conceals the gun itself, whereas the crew and ammunition find shelter in the one to the left. These shelters take the shape of sloping pits, 6 to 7 ft in depth, covered with branches and camouflage material. It is said to be standard practice with enemy artillery units to displace pieces at least once every day to alternate positions which are allegedly reconnoitered in advance but not prepared prior to occupation. In spite of repeated insistence by corps artillery sections that dummy firing positions be constructed to mislead United Nations aircraft and reconnaissance patrols, prisoners assert that even after the tactical situation became stabilized in August of last year, North Korean artillery commanders in the field found it impracticable to comply with these regulations.

PsW contend that no special infantry, antitank or tank detachments are normally assigned as security to artillery

units, since the crews themselves are responsible for the safety of their pieces. Personnel of gun batteries are armed for this purpose with ordinary infantry small arms; in addition, 122mm gun batteries are allegedly equipped with four antitank rifles.

Base maps used by the North Korean Army for fire control purposes purportedly have a scale of 1:50,000. Observation posts, base points, prominent landmarks and located targets are plotted on a firing chart (1:25,000) on which a 1,000-meter grid has been superimposed. The enemy's method of adjusting artillery fire is described as follows by the former Artillery Commander of the 13th North Korean Division: "Fire is adjusted with a single piece, shots being kept on the observer-target line, and the rest of the battery is brought in when the adjustment is correct within 100 meters. The target is bracketed for both range and deflection. A "creeping" method of adjustment is used, when the target lies close to the North Korean troops. The same technique of adjustment is used for both precision and area fire. With a fixed object, it is customary to adjust fire directly on the target. It is standard practice to get an approximate adjustment on dug-in enemy troops, then shift to a nearby empty area, and then after two or three minutes shift directly back to the target. In the case of a moving target, fire is often adjusted on some point along the anticipated line of march ahead of the target; fire is then registered on that point, when the target has reached it."

The North Korean Army reportedly employs only two types of ammunition, high explosive and antitank; smoke shells were not used and allegedly were not available for use. All shells are fitted with contact fuses allowing for instantaneous or delayed action. For calibers up to 76mm the charge is fixed, North Korean artillerymen report; but ammunition for the 122mm howitzer and larger guns is semi-fixed and fire with up to five powder increments is possible. (21)

7. ANTIMECHANIZED DEFENSE

According to PsW, antimechanized defense in the North Korean Army is a combined function of artillery, antitank weapons, and of organic combat engineer detachments. Their reports reflect that in offensive as well as in defensive combat rifle regiments form antitank teams that are normally comprised of elements from the divisional antitank battalion, combat engineer teams (ranging from platoon size to a full company), and a varying number of other troops. These antitank teams are purportedly deployed well to the rear of the main formation as a mobile antitank defense force charged with the mission of attacking and neutralizing hostile tanks that penetrate through the defensive perimeter and safeguarding, in particular, the flanks and rear of the defensive position. Regarding the formation of such antitank teams, the Commanding

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(21) TIS 771, 1607, 1760; ENEMY DOC #200117.

General of the 6th North Korean Division issued the following combat order to his subordinate commanders: "In future combat organizations, use the engineer platoon of the regiment as the nucleus of the combat unit which is appropriately made up of troops assigned to draw enemy fire and equipped with antitank grenades, antitank guns, and antitank mines. Then attack enemy tanks with infantry support to sever the enemy from their tanks. The model example of this tactic was displayed by the 1st Battalion of the 15th Regiment which is now fully confident of destroying enemy tanks."

Obstacles and land mines are also widely employed in the defense against hostile tanks, reports allege. Channelization of tank-supported attacks into pre-registered fire concentrations by means of mine fields and obstacles established in otherwise penetrable territory is apparently a fundamental principle of North Korean defensive operations and is designed to assure economy in the employment of antitank weapons. Furthermore, obstacles, by slowing down or stopping tanks, make them far better targets for antitank guns and rifles. Captured documents disclose that if mines are laid for antitank purposes, the density is usually one or two mines to 1 meter of front. To blockade a road completely, however, at least three mines are buried to every meter of front and the spacing between mines is 2 meters with a minimum depth of six rows. Natural barriers to the movement of vehicles are reportedly employed to the widest possible degree and are integrated into the system of antitank obstacles and mine fields. For reasons of security, the enemy purportedly locates his command posts, important communication centers, and artillery in terrain not easily accessible to tanks.

Antitank rifles with a caliber of 14.5mm and 45mm antitank guns appear to be the basic weapons of the North Korean Army for antimechanized defense; but their usefulness is limited, since the comparative ineffectiveness of their fire against the heavy armor of modern tanks makes them all but obsolete. The 14.5mm PTRS-41 antitank rifle, for instance, is said to be effective only up to distances of approximately 500 yd and can inflict damage on modern heavily-armored tanks only by direct fire at apertures and treads. Consequently, these rifles ostensibly find more employment at present against infantry concentrations, machine gun emplacements, and similar targets than as antitank weapons. PsW report that it is common practice to distribute the antitank rifle company of the divisional antitank battalion by attaching one platoon to each rifle regiment and to retain the fourth platoon as part of the general antitank reserve of the division.

Similarly, the 45mm antitank gun has been superceded by more powerful weapons of recent design. According to the captured commander of an antitank company, the 45mm gun has a maximum range of 7,500 yd. Fitted with a KTM-1 impact fuse, the 45mm armor-piercing projectile can purportedly penetrate up to 2 inches of armor plate at a distance of about 300 meters. Consequently, because of

its limited effectiveness against armor and by virtue of its rapid rate of fire and its mobility, the gun is said to be employed frequently as a general support weapon firing all types of missions where flat-trajectory artillery is called for. Reports assert that when employed in its primary capacity as antitank weapon, the 45mm gun is as a rule emplaced in an open firing position behind tank obstacles and along potential routes of hostile armored thrusts. A former company commander of a divisional antitank battalion describes the employment of the 45mm antitank gun as follows: "The primary mission of the antitank battalion, due to the maneuverability of its truck-towed guns, is to exploit this mobility to the fullest and oppose any hostile armor breakthroughs anywhere along the division sector. In the same sense it is used to reinforce the 45mm antitank company of the rifle regiment whenever necessary. However, in actual practice the battalion usually remains with division and from time to time takes up positions on roads and other probable routes of approach of hostile mechanized forces. On a few occasions guns were brought up to the front lines to be used against enemy personnel."

Larger antitank guns with calibers of 57mm or even 76mm have been reported in the North Korean Army, but they do not seem to be sufficiently numerous to allow general distribution. (22)

8. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE

All available evidence points to the fact that during the prewar training period of the North Korean Army only scant attention was paid to the inculcation of enemy troops with methods of passive and active air defense. In support of this contention a directive issued on 30 June 1950 by the Chief of Staff of the 4th North Korean Division may be cited: "There have been instances in which the antiaircraft units under the control of this division have fired on friendly aircraft and have thereby interfered with the Air Force's objectives. It is hereby directed that commanders of all antiaircraft units will instruct their men on aircraft identification by silhouette and by engine sound. All antiaircraft units will be instructed in air defense techniques."

Because of unremitting UN air attacks, movement by day became extremely hazardous and combat operations were restricted almost exclusively to the hours of darkness. Antiaircraft measures, both active and passive, were speedily implemented. Observation posts for aircraft spotters were allegedly set up on nearby points of vantage and air defense teams were organized from the divisional antiaircraft unit and the antiaircraft machine gun platoons of subordinate units. PW reports indicate that at battalion level one platoon of the battalion machine gun company was usually diverted to air defense. But these organic antiaircraft weapons reportedly proved completely inadequate, particularly during daylight

(22) TIS 210, 1190, 1420, 1529, 1595, 1607; ENEMY DOC #200045, 200117, 200124, 200229, 200494.

operations, and the heavy 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun was found to be unequal to the task of downing modern aircraft. Yet, heavier calibers of antiaircraft weapons are reportedly not organic to North Korean combat units and were attached only under the most extraordinary circumstances. Reports reveal that heavy antiaircraft artillery was employed almost exclusively in the defense of large military targets in the rear, such as major supply dumps and rail heads, higher headquarters, large communication centers, and important industrial targets.

At the front, however, no weapons of similar effectiveness were available and time and again division commanders apparently found themselves obliged to divert a major portion of their infantry weapons to air defense missions. In two reported instances North Korean commanders directed that from 30 to 50 per cent of their ground arms be employed against attacking tactical aircraft; one of these instances is evidenced by the following field order issued by the Commander of the 25th Rifle Regiment preparatory to crossing the NAKTONG River: "Antiaircraft defense will be provided by the regimental antiaircraft unit supplemented by one heavy machine gun section from each battalion. When enemy planes appear, 50 per cent of the infantry weapons will be diverted to air defense." The fact that during a river crossing against deliberately constructed defenses the regimental commander felt justified in diverting half of his infantry weapons from their primary mission can be regarded as evidence of the importance attached to adequate protection from the UN tactical air arm, even allowing for the fact that river crossing operations and bridgeheads are particularly vulnerable to aerial attack.

In another directive, the Commanding General of the 6th Division addressed the following combat order to all divisional units: "In future engagements rid yourselves of the thought that you cannot fight during the day due to enemy air action. In areas where troops are deployed you must thoroughly construct air defenses and camouflage and also assign daily air and ground observers. Under strict control of commanders, each unit must be properly camouflaged so as to be ready for combat at all times. In case a certain target is located by enemy planes, all ground weapons must concentrate fire on low-flying aircraft in any given command to prevent such planes from bombing at will."

As these reports indicate, the enemy, in addition to employing every available weapon in antiaircraft defense, became very adept at various and sundry means of passive air defense, notably camouflage. Enemy prisoners contend that all military installations in forward areas and in the enemy's rear echelon are meticulously concealed from air observation either by means of camouflage nets and other prepared materials or through improvised techniques. The normal method of concealment reportedly consists in covering the vehicle or weapon with fresh branches or grass which are changed every day or, as in the case of supply dumps and headquarters, by hiding the target under bridges and in tunnels. At times, too, the North Koreans

resorted to methods indicative of considerable ingenuity and ability to improvise and adapt customary techniques to field conditions and special circumstances. Tanks made to appear like haystacks and guns or trucks hidden inside native huts may be cited as examples. (23)

9. SPECIFIC TYPES OF DEFENSIVE ACTION

A. Delaying Action in Successive Positions

While captured North Korean documents describe in detail a formula for delaying action in successive positions, little evidence is available to indicate that such action was undertaken on other than a limited scale. Certainly no such coordinated withdrawal took place during the flight of the beaten North Korean Forces during the UN fall offensive. This can probably be attributed to two factors: the speed of the UN drive, and the fact that no training in this complicated maneuver had apparently been offered the North Korean Army. However, since similar tactics are now being employed by the CCF and may be utilized by North Korean units in the future, the following documentary information is offered for what it may be worth.

Characterized by holding action, counterattack and withdrawal on successive lines of defense, a delaying action (called mobile defense in the enemy's terminology) is designed, according to North Korean tactical concepts, to allow an inferior force to trade space for time against a superior attacker. In its general execution this North Korean maneuver is not greatly different from comparable tactics of the United States Army; but in a typical manner, North Korean military doctrine, as evidenced by captured documents, dogmatically elaborates in meticulous detail on mobile defense as on all tactical maneuvers, leaving little to the imagination and initiative of the individual commander.

In this type of action, each regiment allegedly occupies two lines of defense at the same time, but concentrates the bulk of its strength on the forward position. The enemy's defensive doctrine specifies that the distance separating the two positions must be such that having occupied one, an attacker must displace his artillery and mortars and regroup his forces before he can assault the rear position. Part of the artillery is reportedly employed under decentralized control by attaching it to units in the forward position, while the remainder is concentrated in the rear and fires under the control of the senior commander. Strong reserve forces of up to one-third of the effective combat strength of the defending formation are purportedly concentrated well to the rear behind the second line of defense. Documents state that forward units open fire at extreme effective ranges to force the attacker to deploy and to make time-consuming preparations for the assault. But before the

(23) TIS 405, 831, 964, 1878; ENEMY DOC #200038, 200045, 200117, 200188, 200494.

troops holding the forward line are pinned down by hostile fire, they reportedly withdraw to the rear position under cover of fire from supporting weapons. Concurrently with the withdrawal to the second line, sudden and determined counterattacks are generally executed, according to captured enemy documents, to throw the attacker off balance and to inflict casualties. If the forward elements find it impossible to disengage, a determined counterattack directed primarily against the attacker's flank may be launched on orders from the senior commander utilizing rooops from the rear position. (24)

B. Retrograde Movements

According to captured documents, North Korean combat regulations expressly specify that a disengagement or withdrawal may be executed only on orders from the senior commander. PW reports state that prior to a retrograde movement the route of withdrawal and an assembly area outside of the effective range of hostile artillery are designated. Often a withdrawal is allegedly preceded by brief and piecemeal counterattacks aimed at throwing the attacker off balance. Night time and other periods of low visibility are said to be preferred for the execution of such a movement.

If the circumstances are favorable, combat regulations of the enemy provide that entire units may be withdrawn simultaneously, leaving behind only a small covering force armed with automatic weapons and reinforced by antitank weapons and mortars; for a battalion the normal covering force is allegedly of about platoon strength. Under ordinary conditions, however, withdrawals are reportedly effected by "leap-frogging"; first to withdraw are the heavy supporting weapons and the reserve force followed by the remaining defenders grouped into two echelons. The assistant commander and the commanders of supporting weapons reportedly withdraw with the first echelon in order to organize a new defense position, whereas the commander himself remains behind with the last echelon to direct the withdrawal. At times, too, tank forces are apparently employed as a covering force and were so used in at least one reported instance. As security against parallel pursuit, North Korean doctrine specifies that flank guards be organized (comprised of submachine gun troops and combat engineers equipped with antitank weapons, heavy machine guns, and mortars) to control parallel roads on either flanks of the main body. (25)

C. Combat From Envelopment

According to captured enemy documents, North Korean military doctrine dictates that envelopment by the enemy can and must be avoided at all cost. It is therefore considered that envelopment results from failure in combat and blame for falling victim to an opponent's flanking maneuver falls squarely on the shoulders of the unsuccessful commander. Moreover, the North Korean

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(24) ENEMY DOC #200117.
(25) TIS 995, 1212, 1410, 1611; ENEMY DOC #200117.

tactical code provides that the trapped commander is still responsible for the execution of his assigned mission and may attempt a disengagement from encirclement only on orders from the senior commander.

The North Korean Army, consequently, stresses measures designed to prevent encirclement. PsW state that the commander threatened by an envelopment conducts constant reconnaissance of threatened sectors, and attempts to launch quick and resolute counterattacks under concentrated fire from all weapons. This is reportedly accomplished by organizing reserves equipped with anti-tank weapons and assembling them in the most seriously threatened sector, and by preserving the mobility and maneuverability of his force under all circumstances. Combat regulations of the enemy specify that should the unit be surrounded notwithstanding these precautions, then the troops must be kept dispersed to escape the effects of hostile fire and at the same time the attacker must be denied the opportunity to annihilate the unit piecemeal. Supporting weapons reportedly fire under centralized control with hostile armor as their primary targets.

When a disengagement from encirclement is ordered, aggressive reconnaissance is allegedly resorted to in order to determine the weakest link in the encircling ring of hostile forces. Secrecy is considered paramount in the planning and execution of this maneuver; darkness is therefore preferred and preliminary feints are launched in all directions. To avoid exposure of the plan during its execution, close-combat weapons, notably bayonets and hand grenades, are reportedly employed and the supporting artillery fires no preparatory barrage, unless the disengagement takes place during the day, in which case a short but fierce barrage is laid down. North Korean military leaders apparently hold that the determination with which the breakthrough is executed stands in direct relation to the number of casualties sustained. In deference to this contention, enemy combat regulations provide that more than half of the encircled force must be committed in the disengagement. At the same time a screening force is purportedly left behind to keep the opponent from tightening the envelopment. Responsibility for providing flank security is said to devolve upon the combat team effecting the breakthrough.

Enemy prisoners disclose that when disengagement is clearly impossible and the encircled foe is faced with annihilation, the senior commander may order infiltration through the lines for the purpose of forming guerrilla detachments in the opponent's rear. It is reported that North Korean guerrillas are centrally controlled and are assigned specific missions with the aim of disrupting communications and destroying rear area installations. As recent events have shown, guerrilla units may also figure prominently in supporting an eventual counter-attack by sabotage and harassing of supply movements and communications and by obstructing the withdrawal of UN forces. (26)

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(26) TIS 2253, 2265, 2336, 2337; ENEMY DOC #200097, 200117.

D. Winter Defense

In selecting defensive positions during the winter, the North Korean Army allegedly strives to deprive UN troops of all possible cover and shelter. Installations suitable for shelter that cannot be included in the defense perimeter are reportedly destroyed in order to break down the stamina and morale of UN troops by extended exposure to cold and snow. On the other hand, to avoid comparable exhaustion of his own troops, the enemy is said to organize his defenses in built-up areas providing adequate shelter. He allegedly keeps the bulk of his troops under cover and mans his defenses only with lookouts and security outposts to guard against surprise attacks. North Korean military doctrine, consequently, holds that the inherent difficulties and hardships of combat in winter may be turned to the defender's advantage. Enemy documents disclose that the North Korean invader instructs his troops to take full advantage of the defensive possibilities of combat in winter to include, for instance, the improvisation of antimechanized and antipersonnel obstacles from snow and ice. Trenches, obstacles, gun emplacements, and other defensive installations are reportedly camouflaged with snow as far as feasible; but since perfect camouflage in winter is next to impossible, dummy positions and false defenses are constructed whenever time permits. (27)

E. Defense in Mountainous Terrain

According to captured documents, the enemy's defensive doctrine holds that the control by fire of all low ground from neighboring dominating terrain is of paramount importance in organizing defensive positions in mountainous areas, since it is the effective control of the valleys that decides the outcome of such a defense. The North Korean Army, consequently, constructs its strong-points near military crests from which their observed fire effectively sweeps and controls the low ground below. The roads and valleys themselves are allegedly rendered impassable by roadblocks, antitank weapons, and machine guns. North Korean commanders reportedly attempt to create a fire trap in the draws through which UN troops must attack in order to inflict casualties and make him more vulnerable to a decisive counterattack. As a matter of dogma, the enemy attempts to launch his counterattack downhill to favorably utilize the natural advantages that this type of terrain offers the defender. Captured documents state that unit boundaries may under no circumstances coincide with a road or draw, since such terrain features must be controlled by fire under a unified command and should not be jeopardized by a division of vital functions. (28)

F. Defense of a River Line

According to captured documents, North Korean defensive depth along a river line is considerably less

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(27) TIS 1790; ENEMY DOC #200117.
(28) ENEMY DOC #200117.

than that of a normal defensive position, since the success or failure of a river defense hinges on the ability to break up any attempted crossing in an early stage and to counterattack with speed any hostile elements that succeed in reaching the opposite bank before they gain a firm foothold. Therefore, unless the river bank is very wide or affords little cover, the main line is reportedly established only a short distance from the river. In preparation of a holding action along a river line, the enemy allegedly assembles all crossing equipment on his side of the river or, should that not be feasible, destroys it. Reports indicate that in shallow places suitable for fording underwater obstacles are improvised and mines laid. Potential assembly areas of the attacker and concentrations of river crossing equipment are brought under fire from all available supporting weapons prior to an assault and river crossing sites are allegedly denied by interdictory fire. The North Koreans reportedly consider it of particular importance in a successful river defense to prevent the attacker from reconnoitering the banks of the river; this is, therefore, one of the main missions of automatic weapons, which are emplaced so that their fire sweeps the entire opposite bank. It is furthermore reported that the establishment of bridgeheads must be stopped in an early stage and that, therefore, attacking elements that have succeeded in forcing the river must be engaged immediately by speedy and determined counterattacks launched at the lowest echelon. Coordinated counterattacks by regiment or division are allegedly supported by reserves deployed near the front at concealed assembly areas that afford covered approaches to the river bank. (29)

G. Defense of Towns and Villages

In conformance with Soviet tactical precepts stemming largely from the successful defense of STALINGRAD and LENINGRAD, the North Korean Army reportedly operates under the theory that the caliber of the defending troops, the fire-power of their weapons and the leadership of their commanders count for more in the defense of a city than do sheer numbers. By virtue of the natural advantage that a city lends to the defender, conditioned by the facility with which a handful of well-seasoned troops can tie up a numerically far superior enemy while major reserves concentrated well outside the city prepare for a counteroffensive at the decisive moment, the enemy apparently believes that the number of defending troops has little direct influence on the outcome of combat in inhabited areas. Consequently, North Korean military leaders reportedly use the minimum number of troops consistent with a successful defense, while holding large reserves in readiness for a counterattack under the direction of the senior commander.

Under normal circumstances, enemy documents show, a battalion is charged with the defense of a village or district of a town, a regiment with that of several villages or of a small town, while the defense of a larger

(29) TIS 1595; ENEMY DOC #200117.

town or city is usually assigned to one or more divisions. In organizing the defense of a city, platoons and companies establish strong-points in larger buildings which they prepare for all-around defense. Such buildings are reportedly fireproofed and reinforced by sandbagging the walls, propping up ceilings, by covering floors with about 3 ft of sand, and by similar measures. In order to provide clear fields of fire for automatic weapons and flat trajectory artillery, small buildings that cannot be defended, shrubbery and other obstructions are torn down. Along all possible avenues of attack, the North Koreans purportedly construct various types of obstacles including time bombs and collapsible walls and lay mine fields to impede and harass the attacker. Since the nature of city fighting demands that each building be a self-sufficient island of resistance, adequate supplies of food and ammunition are stored in each platoon and company strong-point prior to the engagement.

Over and above the general reserve under the control of the senior commander, each regiment reportedly organizes small, mobile reserve units composed of rifle elements and reinforced by combat engineer teams, antitank weapons, and independent guns; these are committed against penetrations in the regimental defense sector and against hostile armor as mobile antitank teams. In city defense it is considered particularly important that surprise accompany counterattacks; concealed routes of advance are, therefore, prepared from reserve assembly areas and strong-points by blasting passages through walls and fences separating the backyard of one building from that of the next or by making use of the city's sewage system, if one exists. In fact, the enemy's military doctrine teaches that sewers are particularly suitable as a concealed route of approach for counterattacks against the adversary's deep flank or for establishing roadblocks and ambushes in his rear. By the same token, in order to deny the sewage system to the opponent as a route of approach, all sewer covers in the opponent's rear, are reportedly blocked and mined. (30)

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(30) ENEMY DOC #200117.

The following additional sources were utilized in the preparation of this report:

TIS 713, 733, 913, 1007, 1048, 1049, 1073, 1154, 1175, 1177, 1353, 1405, 1457, 1471, 1568, 1657, 1749, 1768, 1844.

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NORTH KOREAN 3D INFANTRY DIVISION

1. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

Interrogation reports indicate that the 3d Infantry Division was activated at P'YONGYANG sometime in 1948; but PW information differs concerning the exact date of activation. Although the majority of enemy prisoners claim the date to be October 1948, one source insists that the division was formed in February 1948 from the deactivated 3d Independent Infantry Brigade, and several other PsW, in giving the chronology of their military service, report that they were already assigned to component elements of the 3d Division during the summer of 1948. It appears likely, therefore, that the activation process extended over a period of months and that the division was not finally constituted until sometime in October of 1948. In its organization the 3d Division seemingly parallels the structural pattern of the typical North Korean Infantry Division with the 7th, 8th and 9th Rifle Regiments forming the combat nucleus in keeping with the standard triangular organization of enemy military formations. (See Chart No. 1)

Interrogation reports show the bulk of the division's personnel strength to have been drawn from three main sources: the 3d Independent Infantry Brigade, the 2d North Korean Division (from which an entire regiment was transferred) and from personnel in North Korean Army training centers. This initial personnel complement ostensibly consisted of well trained and highly disciplined troops who for the most part were volunteers with at least six months of active military service. All of the personnel from the 3d Independent Infantry Brigade were reportedly transferred to the new 3d Infantry Division, with the majority of the troops going to the 9th Rifle Regiment which was at that time being organized in HAMHUNG (39°54'N-127°32'E). During the same period the 7th Regiment, stationed in CH'ORWON (38°14'N-127°12'E), is purported to have received an influx of volunteers from military training camps in the Songjin (40°40'N-129°12'E) Area. In November 1948, the entire 6th Regiment of the 2d North Korean Division was reportedly transferred from NANAM (41°42'N-129°41'E) to WONSAN (39°10'N-127°26'E), where it was incorporated into the 3d Division as the 8th Rifle Regiment. Fragmentary information indicates furthermore that the divisional artillery was also organized at WONSAN and received its initial training there. (1)

It is estimated that at the time of its activation the division received a total of about 6,000 experienced men, who were followed by a stream of fillers that continued to arrive until just prior to the invasion of the Republic of KOREA. These new troops were allegedly subjected to a basic training course consisting of close order drill, manual of arms, calesthenics, military discipline and political lectures, with major emphasis placed

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(1) TIS 855, 901, 1467, 1624, 1641, 1736, 1762, 1816, 2300.

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NORTH KOREAN 3D INFANTRY DIVISION

EST T/O STRENGTH: 11,000



Chart prepared by ATIS - GHQ FEC
from material obtained from NK PsW

Chart 1

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on political indoctrination. One regimental political officer, a senior lieutenant, states that since most of the men were from the laboring class, the indoctrination process was very successful. He adds that political education centers around anti-American propaganda supplemented by lectures on the merits of communism, films showing the daily life of a Soviet worker, cultural and educational movies and orientation sessions on current events. While the recruits went through their basic training cycle, some of the more experienced men allegedly engaged in squad and platoon problems and advanced weapons training. Upon completion of basic training some of the men assigned to technical and specialized units of the division were purportedly sent to technical schools of the North Korean Army for advanced technical courses. Several prisoners report that they attended classes on the self-propelled gun at the armored training school in SADONG (39°02'N-125°48'E). Another PW relates that he was among a group of 30 men who were sent to the Defense Ministry Signal School at P'YONGYANG, where they attended a course which included instruction in basic electricity, signal maintenance and code transmission. After seven months training he was able to transmit and receive 18 words per minute in five-letter random codes. After completing the course, the source was commissioned a junior lieutenant and assigned as instructor to a new class of 34 students who were given a shortened course of radio communications training lasting only four months. Upon graduation the lieutenant and his men were allegedly transferred back to the 3d Division. (2)

Sometime during the early part of 1949 divisional headquarters is reported to have moved to HAMHUNG, where the 9th Regiment was undergoing training. The division by that time was close to full strength and except for the incoming recruits most of the men had completed their basic training. Tactical exercises on squad, platoon and company level, along with strenuous physical exercises, were reportedly conducted in the mountainous terrain around HAMHUNG. Meanwhile the division experienced a periodic depletion in manpower by virtue of the fact that it was repeatedly called on to furnish cadres for new units of the rapidly expanding North Korean Army and because of the need of sending men to various service schools and officers' training courses. This was largely offset by the flow of conscripts arriving in the division almost daily; the largest group of these, numbering about 1,600 men, is reported to have been received in the early part of March 1949. (3)

In June 1949 those elements of the 3d Division that were stationed at HAMHUNG were allegedly transferred to new locations in a move that was designed to make room for newly-organized units of the North Korean Army. Division Headquarters is said to have moved to WONSAN, where the artillery units and the 8th Infantry Regiment were already stationed, while the 9th Regiment moved farther south to the Kumhwa (38°18'N-127°28'E) Area, placing

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(2) TIS 598, 1508, 1710, 1978.
(3) TIS 779.

it close to the 7th Regiment located at CH'ORWON. Shortly after this move was accomplished the division is said to have begun advanced training with units spending most of their time in the field. During this period prisoners report frequent maneuvers of battalion-size units and state that stress was chiefly laid on camouflage, patrolling and how to maintain contact between units in the field by means of elaborate bugle calls, whistles, flares and hand signals. Soviet officers who had been seen occasionally during earlier training phases were now present at every important field problem, enemy prisoners relate, and seemingly held final authority in all decisions. (4)

By the latter part of 1949, the 3d Division, hardly a year old, was reportedly considered one of the best trained units in the North Korean Army. The division, while not fully equipped, was apparently better armed than most units, notably with crew-served weapons which at that early stage in the development of the North Korean Army were almost non-existent in some organizations. Consequently, 3d Division troops had the advantage of training with their table of equipment weapons. The 7th and 9th Regiments, stationed close to the 38th Parallel, were apparently required to perform border patrol duty, for reports show that at various times during the early part of 1950 separate battalions from these regiments were patrolling in the vicinity of HWACHON (38°06'N-127°42'E), CHICH'ON-NI (38°02'N-127°40'E) and SACH'ANG-NI (38°04'N-127°32'E). During this period extensive field maneuvers were carried out and the influx of new personnel was gradually bringing the division to full strength. One group of approximately 1,500 conscripts, who reported in March 1950, is believed to have been the last contingent of fillers to be assigned to the division prior to the invasion. These men were issued new rifles and were only allowed to fire four rounds of ammunition in the course of their basic training. Supplies and equipment were pouring in and most reports indicate that very few shortages existed at this time. (5)

At the beginning of June 1950, division headquarters, the 8th Infantry Regiment and the divisional artillery are said to have made preparations to depart WONSAN in order to join the other two infantry regiments in the south. Division Headquarters, which is believed to have moved first, reportedly set up a temporary command post at KUMHWA. On or about 19 June 1950 the 9th Regiment reportedly moved out of the Kumhwa Area and marched to SACH'ANG-NI (38°04'N-127°32'E), where it took up field positions. At roughly the same time the 7th Regiment is said to have departed CH'ORWON and bivouacked in the vicinity of YONGP'YONG (38°00'N-127°13'E). On about 22 June 1950 the 8th Regiment with the remaining elements of the 3d Division departed WONSAN by rail and reached CH'ORWON the next day. From there it proceeded toward the border to join the rest of the division. Although the rank and file soldier of the North Korean Army was unaware of the plans to attack the Republic of KOREA, a

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(4) TIS 364, 844, 1624.
(5) TIS 572.

captured field order from the Intelligence Department of the North Korean Army General Staff, dated 18 June 1950 and addressed to Chief of Staff of the 3d Division, definitely proves the familiarity of certain higher-ranking officers with the invasion plans. This order furnished detailed information on ROK defensive positions and prescribed a reconnaissance plan which included the exact names of towns that the 3d Division later actually occupied on its way to SEOUL. After the entire division had assembled along the 38th Parallel in the Kumhwa - Ch'orwon - Yongp'yong triangle, ammunition and hand grenades were allegedly issued to the troops and last-minute preparations for the impending invasion were made. On 24 June 1950, the 3d Division moved into jump-off positions along its assigned route of attack, the Kumhwa - Seoul Highway, in accordance with carefully prepared communist designs to extend their hegemony over all of KOREA. (6)

2. COMBAT HISTORY (For Route and Major Engagements, see Plates 1 and 2, following page 36)

At 0100 hours on 25 June 1950, the 3d Division, under the command of Major General LEE Yong Ho, was allegedly deployed along a line running generally from YONCH'ON (38°06'N-127°04'E) to SACH'ANG-NI, with the 2d Division to its left and the 4th on its right flank. The 7th Regiment occupied positions on the right of the Kumhwa - Seoul Highway, interrogation reports reveal, with the 9th Regiment abreast of it on the left. The 8th Regiment was reportedly held in reserve positions along the same highway, about one-half mile to the rear. A 15-minute artillery barrage at 0500 hours reportedly signaled the beginning of the invasion. Spearheaded by attached tanks from the 105th Armored Division, leading elements of the 7th and 9th Infantry Regiments are reported to have crossed the line of departure at approximately 0515. In the face of only slight resistance from the surprised and hopelessly outnumbered ROK defenders, the division was able to make rapid progress at first, but began to meet more determined resistance after reaching the outskirts of POCHON (37°54'N-127°13'E) at about 2300 hours. After a brief withdrawal, the leading units consequently entrenched a short distance outside town. Early next morning the division entered the town without incident, it is reported, since the ROK defenders effected a withdrawal during the night. Continuing the advance the North Korean invaders approached UIJONGBU (37°44'N-127°02'E), where they were met by heavy artillery and small arms fire. The 9th Regiment in a flanking movement through the mountains allegedly attempted to by-pass the town, but was held up by well-placed machine gun fire. In the meantime the 7th Regiment attacking UIJONGBU from the northeast along the main highway was engaged in a small-arms battle that lasted about an hour. After flushing out some small pockets of resistance, the 7th Regiment entered the town simultaneously with leading elements of the 4th Division, which was driving south along the Yonch'on - Seoul road. Third Division prisoners report that many of the men, tired by long marches over rough

(6) TIS 480; ENEMY DOC #200564.

terrain and through intermittent showers, were beginning to fall out with swollen feet. During the advance through generally deserted villages the armored units attached to the division are reported to have been held up periodically by demolished and impassable bridges. Continuing the drive on SEOUL the 9th Regiment, which was heading the advance, was purportedly greeted with heavy machine gun fire at about 1900 hours on 27 June. Enemy troops give the ROK defenders credit for a fierce fight; but after holding their position all night, they were forced to withdraw the next morning. Fighting isolated rear guard actions, the ROK troops managed to delay the invader's entry into their capitol until about 1300 hours on 28 June. Upon entering SEOUL the soldiers of the 3d Division were greeted by an active fifth column that assisted them in rounding up remaining ROK troops, policemen and civil servants. The 3d Division reportedly occupied the eastern half of the city and established its command post at Camp SOBINGGO (37°32'N-127°00'E), a former American dependent housing area. Late in the afternoon the division received its first air attack when two planes strafed and damaged a self-propelled gun and wounded several of the crew. An evaluation of pertinent reports reveals that the 3d Division in its drive on the ROK capitol suffered approximately 400 casualties, most of them in the 7th and 9th Regiments. (7)

The division allegedly spent the next day in SEOUL resting and preparing for its next objective. Early in the morning of the 30th, the 8th Regiment crossed the HAN River in the vicinity of the Sobinggo Ferry by means of wooden boats capable of carrying a 2½-ton truck or from 20 to 30 troops; the crossing was opposed by only scattered artillery and small arms fire. All attached tanks were left on the north bank of the river, it is reported, because all HAN River bridges had been destroyed. In the morning of 2 July the last elements of the division reached the other side of the river without serious mishap, thus bringing to a successful conclusion the first phase of the invasion. (8)

On its way to SUWON (37°16'N-127°01'E) the division, with the 8th Regiment in the lead, was engaged several times by isolated ROK units which succeeded in slowing its progress and inflicting minor casualties. Upon entering SUWON on or about 5 July it was discovered that the battered town had already been occupied by elements of the 4th Division which were preparing to continue the advance toward TAEJON (36°20'N-127°26'E). After a short rest the 3d Division passed through the town and marched southward, still in the wake of the 4th Division. On the way the troops reportedly encountered several destroyed tanks and trucks as well as many dead ROK and US soldiers; this was the first indication for most of the men that the US had extended active military assistance to the ROK Army. Reports reveal that the division reached OSAN (37°10'N-127°04'E) late in the evening and remained there until early the next morning, when it

(7) TIS 1, 7, 32.
(8) TIS 48, 49.

resumed its advance. Approximately 4 miles south of OSAN the 9th Regiment allegedly swung southeast toward ANSONG (37°00'N-127°16'E), while the rest of the division followed the 4th Division toward P'YONGTAEK (37°00'N-127°05'E). Although the 9th Regiment met only minor resistance from isolated ROK units, it was reportedly slowed down considerably by the movement through difficult, mountainous terrain. Late in the afternoon the regiment reached a wide canyon situated approximately 1½ miles north of YANGSONG (37°04'N-127°12'E) and bivouacked there for the night. Next morning the unit continued its difficult route through the mountains and finally entered ANSONG late in the evening of 7 July. Since units of the 2d Division were already occupying the town, the regiment marched on to the outskirts and dug in for the night. Meanwhile the rest of the division continued south following behind the 4th Division. Prisoners relate that the marching column was subjected to several strafing and bombing attacks which forced the troops off the main road and destroyed much of the heavy equipment. After passing through P'YONGTAEK and SONGHWAN (36°54'N-127°08'E) without engaging UN Forces, the main body reached the northern outskirts of CHONAN (36°48'N-127°10'E) on or about 9 July and found the 4th Division heavily engaged. At this point the 9th Regiment, which had continued its diversionary route through IPCHANG (36°54'N-127°14'E), allegedly linked up again with the rest of the 3d Division. Later in the day the 8th and 9th Regiments were reportedly committed on the left of the 4th Division. Casualties sustained in this engagement were light, but the division was held up all day by intense artillery fire. Early in the evening a concerted attack coupled with infiltration tactics succeeded in piercing UN defenses and by 2400 hours the town was occupied. (9)

The division was purportedly held up all the next day. Heavy artillery and small-arms fire allegedly broke up repeated attacks so that by nightfall only slight progress had been made. After dark the division is said to have renewed the attack employing the same tactics that were so successful the night before. Again the defenders were forced to withdraw and the division occupied the abandoned UN positions for the night. On the morning of 11 July, the 3d Division pushed its advance to within a few miles of CHONUI (36°40'N-127°12'E), where it was again met by heavy artillery and mortar fire. When it finally entered the town after a four-hour battle, it was subjected to strafing and bombing attacks by UN aircraft. Fires were raging almost everywhere in the badly damaged town. The 7th Regiment, which constituted the divisional reserve, was ordered to by-pass CHONUI because of all the debris that made movement through it difficult. After spending the night in the outskirts of town, the division, fighting only against small-scale delaying actions, reached CHOCHIWON (36°36'N-127°18'E) the next day, where it was again held up. After a fierce artillery bombardment of UN positions by attached tanks and self-propelled guns, the troops forced their way into town and pursued the retreating UN forces to the KUM River. Finding the river

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(9) TIS 490, 779, 1464.

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strongly defended, the 3d Division remained on the northern bank and sent out reconnaissance patrols while making preparations for the crossing. On the morning of the 14th, the division reportedly attempted to cross the river at two places but was forced to withdraw. After fighting an intense artillery duel during most of the day, a second attempt to cross was repelled in the afternoon. Interrogation reports indicate that preparations were made on the 15th for an all-out attack along the entire river line; but repeated air strikes were hampering the movement of heavy equipment and reportedly had instilled a deadly fear in the minds of most of the troops. Political officers, aware of the declining morale, appear to have intensified their propaganda effort by assuring the troops that the war would soon be over and promised the men a long-needed rest after they captured TAEJON. They also stressed that although TAEJON would be strongly defended, the "defeated" Americans would all surrender once the city had been taken. Early in the morning of 16 July, the division reportedly crossed the KUM River in the face of only scattered small-arms and mortar fire. Since the UN defenders had withdrawn to new positions before TAEJON during the night, the 3d Division made rapid progress and most of the units were across the river before noon. Fighting all the way, the division reached the northern outskirts of TAEJON by the afternoon of the 18th. In a coordinated action with the 4th Division (attacking from the west), the 3d Division finally entered the city on or about 21 July 1950 after almost three days of heavy fighting. Reports reveal that the 3d Division, which had not received any replacements since the outbreak of hostilities, had suffered approximately 3,000 casualties up to this time. (10)

After entering the city the division purportedly spent the rest of the day reorganizing and resting. On the afternoon of 22 July, the 7th Regiment was reportedly committed for the first time in an attack along the highway leading from TAEJON to KUMCH'ON (36°06'N-128°08'E) with YONGDONG (36°10'N-127°46'E) as its objective. It met very little resistance, PsW state, and, after spending the night in the mountains en route, reached OKCHON (36°18'N-127°34'E) the following day. After a short rest the unit allegedly continued its advance to within a few miles of SIMCHON-NI (36°14'N-127°44'E), where it took up positions for the night. On the 24th, the 7th Regiment, still spearheading the 3d Division drive, reached the outskirts of YONGDONG, where it was held up for the rest of the day by heavy machine gun and artillery fire. The regiment is reported to have infiltrated through the defenders' positions under the cover of darkness, but became so widely dispersed that the next morning, after a fierce fight, it found itself in a very precarious position. The 9th Regiment, which had joined in the attack that morning, made good progress but suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire in the early stages of the battle. Toward noon the UN forces began to withdraw and the division occupied the city shortly thereafter. After clearing the city the division took up positions along

(10) TIS 643, 759, 854.

the eastern edge of the town and prepared for a counter-attack. In the course of this battle the division is estimated to have suffered approximately 2,000 casualties. Next morning the 7th Regiment again separated from the division and swung southwest toward MUJU (36°00'N-127°40'E), apparently in a pincer movement aimed at KUMCH'ON, for fragmentary information indicates that the regiment passed thru MUJU, SOLCH'ON (36°00'N-127°48'E) and CHIRYE (35°58'N-128°02'E). By about 28 July it had allegedly penetrated to KUMCH'ON along the main Taejon - Kumch'on Highway, fighting every inch of the way, and approached the eastern end of that city on or about 29 July. On 3 August, after a four-day battle, KUMCH'ON was finally occupied when the defenders were forced to withdraw under the threat of encirclement from three sides. Division strength at this time has been estimated at about 4,500 men, with the infantry regiments reduced to about 900 men each. (11)

The 3d Division is said to have remained in the Kumch'on Area for two days resting and preparing for the next move. Here they received their first replacements, a group of 300 North Koreans with from two weeks to one month of training. These men reportedly had little fighting spirit since they had been subjected to almost daily air attacks on the way from SEOUL. After leaving TAEJON the division found it increasingly difficult to obtain supplies. Ammunition is reported to have been at a dangerously low level during several crucial engagements and frequently no rations were issued for as long as two days at a time. Most reports indicate that searching parties were selected to requisition rations locally in order to replenish almost non-existent food stocks. After moving into position in the vicinity of YONGMOK* on 5 August, the division made last-minute preparations for the attack on TAEGU (35°52'N-128°36'E). However, during the night of 6 August, the 3d Division was ordered into new positions farther to the south in the Songju (35°55'N-128°17'E) Area, approximately 4 miles southwest of WAEGWAN (36°00'N-128°24'E), in preparation for the assault across the NAKTONG River. At 0300 hours on 9 August the 7th Regiment began to cross the river at a point boasting a firm, sandy bottom with a depth of approximately 5 ft and a slow current. The troops allegedly waded across holding their weapons above their shoulders. Participants in the operation relate that shortly after the leading elements of the regiment reached the east bank the whole area was illuminated by parachute flares. A murderous machine gun and artillery barrage opened up inflicting heavy casualties on the troops still in the water. Those who managed to reach the other side purportedly fought their way up a hill located approximately 1½ miles from the river. After the crest of the hill was secured, they dug in and began to reorganize, for units had lost contact and become disorganized in the darkness and heavy fighting, and some men did not rejoin their organization until several hours after daylight. About half an hour after the 7th Regiment had established a bridgehead, the 8th and 9th Regiments, located a slight distance south, are reported

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(11) TIS 500, 598, 661, 1508.

to have attempted a simultaneous crossing. When they were in mid-stream the area was again illuminated and a stream of machine gun and artillery fire opened up and decimated their ranks. In order to escape the murderous bombardment, they allegedly were forced to withdraw to their original positions; the few men who managed to reach the eastern bank state that they were promptly taken prisoner. In this action the two regiments are said to have been reduced to about 500 men each and were so disorganized that it took them two full days to reassemble and reorganize. (12)

At daybreak the 7th Regiment, situated on a hill overlooking the river, was reportedly busy preparing defensive positions when a terrific artillery barrage opened up. A light plane kept circling the area, apparently to direct the fire. Shortly afterwards the troops also began to receive mortar fire. The fire purportedly continued intermittently for two days. During this time the regiment was effectively pinned down, for troops of this unit report that they did not dare to stir from their positions during the hours of daylight. At approximately 0200 hours on 11 August, the 7th Regiment, with its ammunition exhausted and its meager food supplies almost used up, was finally forced to withdraw across the NAKTONG. When the unit reassembled on the west bank of the river, it developed that only about 300 men were left out of the entire regiment and some companies are reported to have been completely wiped out. On or about 12 August the 7th Regiment allegedly rejoined the rest of the division, which had withdrawn to the Yongmok Area after the 8th and 9th Regiments' disastrous attempt to cross the NAKTONG River.

As a consequence of its heavy losses the 3d Division was placed in reserve and given approximately 1,500 replacements who had allegedly received only a few days' training. The division remained in this location reorganizing its badly depleted units until 28 August, when it moved to the Poksong-Dong (36°02'N-128°22'E) Area and deployed along the west bank of the NAKTONG. Prisoners contend that the division remained in this location until 12 September and received an additional 3,000 replacements, which brought its strength up to approximately 7,000 men. Due to the general shortage of weapons many of the new men were armed only with grenades and instructed to pick up any weapons they were able to find on the battlefield. On 12 September the division again forded the NAKTONG River, this time without opposition, and marched to WAEGWAN, where it arrived about noon on 13 September. While passing through the city the troops were reportedly subjected to a heavy strafing and bombing attack. After following the Waegwan - Taegu Highway in a southeastern direction for a distance of about 4 miles, the division purportedly marched through the mountains and took up defensive positions just north of the main road. Jumping off from these positions on about 14 September, the 3d Division reportedly joined in the general all-out assault on TAEGU and was constantly engaged with

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(12) TIS 444, 574, 1624.

UN forces until 20 September. During this period the continual air and artillery attacks are alleged to have caused heavy casualties. Since most of the soldiers in the division were recent replacements with very little taste for battle, numerous reports indicate that after reading UN surrender leaflets many decided that their cause was hopeless and surrendered at the first opportunity. On or about 20 September, after being exposed to renewed pressure all along the front, the division was reportedly ordered to withdraw to SANGJU (36°24'N-128°10'E). Fragmentary information indicates that the divisional strength was approximately 5,000 men at this time. During its withdrawal toward WAEGWAN the 3d Division ostensibly received a terrific pounding from strafing and bombing UN aircraft, for reports mention that entire units were seized by blind panic and retreated in confusion. Reports furthermore contend that when the remaining units of the division withdrew across the NAKTONG River just north of WAEGWAN, they sustained tremendous casualties and were practically annihilated. According to fragmentary reports, division headquarters and other elements of the 3d Division, totaling approximately 1,800 men, succeeded in reaching SANGJU, where they were ordered to retreat north. After separating into small groups, they began to arrive in P'YONGYANG on about 1 October. During its two-week stay in the North Korean capital, the division is reported to have swelled its ranks to a total strength of about 1,500 troops by the integration of recent conscripts inducted during September and October. In the face of the impending capture of P'YONGYANG by the victorious UN forces, the 3d Division was reportedly ordered on about 15 October to resume its withdrawal to a reassembly and reorganization area in the north, leaving behind only a small covering force. From this point on the history of the 3d Division becomes obscured in contradictory reports and cannot be traced with any degree of certainty until the reconstituted division was again committed in the Seoul Area during the recent Chinese Communist offensive. Two PsW indicate that the badly mauled division retreated to the northern redoubt of the North Korean Army in the Kanggye (40°58' N-126°36'E) Area, where it was reorganized and engaged in some minor actions with advance UN spearheads. According to another source, however, one regiment of the 3d Division, the 7th, underwent reorganization at IWON (40°20'N-128°36'E) during November and proceeded to the Hungnam (39°54'N-127°32'E) Area on about 18 December to participate in the enemy's final assaults against the UN 10th Corps perimeter. In direct conflict with these reports, a North Korean guerrilla and intelligence agent of doubtful reliability insists that the 3d Division to which his unit became attached crossed into MANCHURIA and reassembled at an unknown location approximately 25 miles north of the YALU River, where it was subjected to a brief training cycle together with 20,000 other North Korean troops. The PW believes that the troops training and being reorganized in this area comprised the 2d North Korean Corps. According to this same account, the 3d Division recrossed the YALU River on 24 December at SINUIJU (40°06'N-124°24'E) and, after passing through P'YONGYANG, reached KAESONG (37°58'N-126°26'E) on 29 December. From this town the division presumably headed east and then swung south, for subsequent reports indicate that it

engaged ROK troops near UIJONGBU on about 2 January 1951. The following day, when the division arrived in SEOUL, it was allegedly attached to an unidentified CCF unit to spearhead the renewed Chinese offensive. The last available information, dating from 5 January 1951, indicates that the division was actively engaged in the Suwon Area. (13)

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(13) TIS 1191, 1412, 2379, 2988, 3039, 3094, 3193.

The following additional sources were utilized in the preparation of this report:

TIS 179, 480, 481, 487, 494, 500, 505, 506, 595, 596, 756, 1048, 1252, 1264, 1272, 1278, 1467, 1511, 1641, 1762, 1816, 2300.

PLATE 1

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN
3D INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD OCTOBER 1948 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1950

LOCALE NO.	PAGE NO.	LOCALE	REMARKS
1	26	P'YONGYANG (39°01'N-125°44'E)	Seat of 3d Div Hq from Oct 48 to the early part of 1949
2	26	HAMHUNG (39°54'N-127°32'E)	Training area of the 9th Regt from Oct 48 to Jun 49 and location of 3d Div Hq from early 1949 to Jun 49
3	26	WONSAN (39°10'N-127°26'E)	Training area of the 8th Regt and division artillery from Oct 48 to Jun 50 and location of 3d Div Hq from Jun 49 to Jun 50
4	26	CH'ORWON (38°14'N-127°32'E)	Training area of the 7th Regt from Oct 1948 to outbreak of war
5	27	KUMHWA (38°18'N-127°28'E)	Location of the 9th Regt from Jun 49 to outbreak of war and temporary location of 3d Div Hq in Jun 50
6	29	YONCH'ON Area (38°06'N-127°04'E)	Location of the division prior to the invasion of 25 Jun 50
7	29	UIJONGBU (37°44'N-127°02'E)	Link-up with 4th Div
8	30	SEOUL (37°34'N-127°00'E)	Entered SEOUL 28 Jun
9	30	SUWON (37°16'N-127°01'E)	Entered SUWON 5 Jul
10	31	ANSONG (37°00'N-127°16'E)	Captured on 7 Jul by flanking movement of 9th Regt
11	31	CHONAN (36°48'N-127°10'E)	First large-scale engagement on 9 Jul
12	32	KUM River	Crossing effected on 16 Jul
13	32	TAEJON (36°20'N-127°26'E)	Battle for TAEJON 18 to 21 Jul

LOCALE NO.	PAGE NO.	LOCALE	REMARKS
14	32	YONGDONG (36°10'N-127°46'E)	Battle for YONGDONG 24 to 26 Jul
15	33	MUJU (36°00'N-127°40'E)	7th Regt's flanking movement aimed at KUMCH'ON
16	33	KUMCH'ON (36°06'N-128°08'E)	Entered KUMCH'ON 3 Aug
17	33	NAKTONG River (35°58'N-128°24'E)	Crossing effected by 7th Regt on 9 Aug
18	34	YONGMOK* (approx 36°08'N-128°20'E)	Division reserve positions from 12 to 28 Aug
19	34	POKSONG-DONG (36°02'N-128°22'E)	Position from 29 Aug to 12 Sep
20	34	WAEGWAN (36°00'N-128°24'E)	From positions near town division participated in all-out assault on TAEGU from 14 to 20 Sep
21	35	SANGJU	Initial reassembly point of defeated 3d Div

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

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

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

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS
OF NK 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD OCTOBER 1948-
20 SEPTEMBER 1950

PLATE 1

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PLATE 2

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN
3D INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD 21 SEPTEMBER 1950 - 29 DECEMBER 1950

LOCALE NO.	PAGE NO.	LOCALE	REMARKS
1	35	SANGJU (36°24'N-128°10'E)	Initial reassembly point of defeated 3d Div
2	35	P'YONGYANG (39°01'N-125°44'E)	Remnants of the division assembled here from 1 to 15 Oct
3	35	KANGGYE (40°58'N-126°36'E)	Possible reassembly and reorganization area of the 3d Div
4	35	HUNGNAM (39°54'N-127°32'E)	Elements of the division reportedly engaged in assault against UN X Corps perimeter on about 18 Dec
5	35	KAESONG (37°58'N-126°26'E)	Division passed through this area on 29 Dec

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

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
KOREA BAY
JAPAN SEA
YELLOW SEA
KOREA
CHOLSAN
SONCHON
CHONGJU
PAKCHON
KUNURI
SINANJU
UNSANNI
CHANGIMNI
YANGDOK
PYONGYANG
YONGGANG
CHINNAMPO
KYOKPO
CHAERYONG
NAMCHONJOM
KIRINNI
HAEJU
TAETAN
ONGJIN
CHONGDAN
PAEKCHON
KAESONG
INCHON
SEOUL
YANPYONG
KOKSURI
CHAJANGNI
CHUNCHON
YONGWON
TOKCHON
YONGHUNG
KOWON
WONSAN
KOKSAN
ICHON
CHORWON
KUMHWA
YONGCHON
HWACHON
YANGGU
INJE
YANGYANG
CHUMUNJIN
SAMCHOK
YONGWOL
UTCHIN
PYONGTAEK
CHUNGJU
TAEJON
KUMCHON
GUNZAW
CHONJU
KOCHANG
NAMWON
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SUNCHON
TAEGU
YONGCHON
KYONGJU
PUSAN
CHEJU ISLAND
MESULPO
MILES



MAP NO 5 REVISED 7 JULY 48

NORTH KOREAN 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

PW interrogation reports indicate that the 5th North Korean Division was activated at NANAM (41°42'N-129°41'E), North KOREA, during the early part of August 1949 from Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army's 164th Division, which had been stationed in the old Manchurian capitol city of CHANGCHUN (43°52'N-125°21'E) until July 1949. According to the majority of reports, all non-Korean troops of the 164th CCF Division were transferred to other Chinese Communist organizations in July 1949 and in their place the division began to receive Korean soldiers from various other units of the Chinese Communist Forces. Concurrently with this metamorphosis in the personnel composition, a change is reported to have taken place in the command echelon of the division; Major General KIM CHAN DUK, the former assistant division commander, allegedly replaced an unnamed Chinese general as the new division commander. Some of the Koreans assigned to the 164th Division had allegedly seen action against the Japanese Army during World War II; but the majority were veterans of the Chinese civil war who had been inducted into the communist armies of CHINA at a later date, while a comparatively small percentage of these troops stemmed from an even more recent conscription drive conducted in the various provinces in MANCHURIA. Since the personnel of this reconstituted 164th Division originated from widely separated units of the Chinese Communist Forces, a wide scale of military experience appears to have been represented among the troops, ranging from seasonal agricultural labor and security duties to active commitment in combat. Almost all troops are said to have received training with Japanese weapons, which the Soviet occupation forces in MANCHURIA had turned over to the Chinese Communists, and American weapons captured from the retreating Chinese Nationalist Army. (1)

During the latter part of July 1949 the 164th Division, with a strength of approximately 7,500 men, was allegedly transferred by railroad from CHANGCHUN to NANAM, where it was integrated into the expanding North Korean Army and redesignated the 5th Division. Most of the American and Japanese weapons which had been brought with the division from MANCHURIA were purportedly turned in and replaced by limited amounts of Soviet-manufactured equipment. At the same time the division underwent a reorganization to make it conform to the organizational structure of the standard North Korean rifle division, with the 10th, 11th and 12th Rifle Regiments (also known as the 1st, 2d and 3d Regiments) forming the combat nucleus of the new division. (See Chart No. 2) Most reports show that from the time of its activation until December 1949 the division was engaged principally in road repairs and construction work of a military nature. Beginning in January 1950 the entire division was allegedly subjected to a new basic training cycle in order to

(1) TIS 36, 427, 870, 907, 2020.

accustom these Chinese Communist-trained troops to the military terminology and tactics peculiar to the North Korean Army. This training is said to have been conducted under the supervision of six Soviet military advisors, two colonels and four lieutenant colonels, who remained with the division until it was committed in the drive across the 38th Parallel. Early in February 1950 the division purportedly began a new phase of advanced field training on a platoon and company level with emphasis on mountain warfare and camouflage. Around the middle of the same month the first group of fillers arrived, numbering approximately 1,000 men between the ages of 18 and 26 years. Prior to their assignment to the various units in the division, these troops were allegedly given one month of basic training which included instruction in marksmanship and familiarization firing with live ammunition. From then on the division reportedly continued to receive recruits until about the beginning of April, when reports indicate that it had been brought up to full strength. Most of the new men had allegedly completed basic training by the end of April. PsW relate that during this same period infantry and artillery units conducted combined maneuvers. (2)

In May the division was reportedly brought up to its full allowance of weapons and equipment with huge quantities of Soviet materiel and all units were required to turn in any remaining American or Japanese weapons which had been brought from MANCHURIA. One captured supply officer states that when he was sent to CHONGJIN (41°46'N-129°49'E) to pick up supplies for the division engineers, he noticed that Chongjin Harbor was full of Soviet merchant ships unloading trucks, weapons and ammunition. According to Korean-speaking crew members of Soviet vessels, they had come from VLADIVOSTOK (43°08'N-131°54'E). During May and in the first two weeks of June the troops were allegedly busy firing individual weapons; but each man was only allowed to fire three rounds. Simultaneously, political indoctrination, which had been stressed throughout the training period, was intensified.

About the middle of June all equipment was allegedly given a final check to insure its combat readiness and prepared for shipment south. In explanation the troops were told that they were going on maneuvers; nevertheless, many of the men were skeptical when they were issued live ammunition and grenades. On 19 June leading elements of the division are said to have departed NANAM by rail for YANGYANG (38°04'N-128°38'E), where they arrived by 23 June; by 25 June the movement of the division's combat elements had been completed. The 10th Regiment, which was the first to assemble at YANGYANG, allegedly departed south immediately after its arrival and bivouacked in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. It was followed in short order by the other two infantry regiments and on the night of 24 June the 5th Division, with the exception of a few rear echelon units still en route, was reportedly deployed along the 38th Parallel south of YANGYANG. (3)

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(2) TIS 175, 423, 427, 870, 1039, 2020.
(3) TIS 423, 1257, 2020.

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NORTH KOREAN 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION
EST T/O STRENGTH: 11,000



Chart prepared by ATIS - GHQ FEC
from material obtained from NK PsW

Chart 2

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2. COMBAT HISTORY (For route and major engagements see Plates 3 and 4, following Page 46)

At approximately 0500 hours on 25 June, according to enemy prisoners, the 5th Division lunged across the 38th Parallel in an offensive down the main road that parallels KOREA's rugged east coast. The division's drive was allegedly supported by the 766th Independent Unit, an organization with a strength of 1,500 men which appears to have been part of a larger amphibious force under the direct control of the North Korean Army's General Headquarters in P'YONGYANG. This unit is reported to have left YANGYANG on 24 June, with the mission of establishing beachheads along the east coast in the rear of the ROK Army in order to disrupt rear area communications and defenses. When its mission had been accomplished and after contact had been established with the main body of the 5th Division, this amphibious guerrilla unit was scheduled to infiltrate through the mountains in the direction of PUSAN (35°06'N-129°02'E) as an ordinary partisan force. Members of this unit are reported to have received extensive amphibious and guerrilla training. (4)

Following closely behind the 766th Unit, the 5th Division, with the 10th Regiment in the lead, entered CHUMUNJIN (37°54'N-128°50'E) without incident shortly before noon. Late that evening, after continuing the drive south, the 766th Unit was allegedly held up on the outskirts of KANGNUNG (37°44'N-128°54'E). The 10th Regiment is reported to have come to its assistance and both units after an all-night battle finally entered the town the next morning. At KANGNUNG the 5th Division separated, PsW contend, with the 11th Regiment heading southwest toward HAJINBU-RI (37°38'N-128°34'E), while the rest of the division continued south along the coastal highway. Along its route of attack, in the vicinity of HAJINBU-RI, the 11th Regiment purportedly met slight resistance and sustained minor casualties. Continuing in its drive along the Kangnung - P'yongch'ang (37°22'N-128°24'E) corridor, the regiment was generally engaged in mopping up small pockets of resistance and finally reached P'YONGCH'ANG on about 2 July. During this action it is reported that the 11th Regiment repeatedly ran into elements of the 7th North Korean Division, which was fighting on the right flank of the 5th Division. Guerrilla units, comprised largely of communists from the Republic of KOREA who had gone into the mountains at the outbreak of hostilities, were also encountered and proved very helpful to the North Korean regulars, since due to their familiarity with the topography in that area they were able to give advice on road conditions and possible hiding places of ROK troops. Soon, however, the gruelling marches over mountainous terrain were beginning to show their effect on the tired troops, and an increasing number of men fell out with sore feet. When the troops were finally given a rest at P'YONGCH'ANG they had been marching almost continuously for seven days. In its flanking movement over some of the most rugged terrain south of the 38th Parallel, the 11th

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(4) TIS 30, 239, 1192, 1425.

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Regiment was allegedly separated several times when company-size units were required to climb steep mountain slopes to ferret out small groups of ROK soldiers hiding in the hills. This was time consuming and exhausting work and the tired and weary soldiers welcomed the long-needed rest.

After spending two days at P'YONGCH'ANG the 11th Regiment moved out again and headed for CHUNYANG (36°56'N-128°54'E) by way of YONGWOL (37°10'N-128°28'E), which was already in communist hands. On the afternoon of 4 July the unit was allegedly subjected to an attack by UN aircraft; while only few casualties resulted in this and similar air attacks, most reports show that the troops greatly feared aircraft and were prone to panic whenever UN planes appeared in the skies. As the regiment drove on in a southeasterly direction over tortuous mountain trails the progress continued to be slow. After marching five days through the hills and meeting only scattered resistance, the outskirts of CHUNYANG were finally reached on 9 July, prisoners relate. Here the 11th Regiment is said to have engaged a large ROK force which was apparently withdrawing from the coast. After an all-day fight the communists managed to occupy the northwestern section of town by nightfall. Early the following morning the unit purportedly entered the town that had been abandoned by the withdrawing UN defenders. Interrogation reports indicate that casualties up to that time approximated 400 men; most of these were apparently sustained in the battle for CHUNYANG. (5)

After separating from the 11th Regiment at KANGNUNG, the 10th and 12th Regiments are reported to have continued south along the coastal highway; one battalion of the 12th Regiment, however, remained behind for five days guarding the town and assisting local communists in organizing the civilian population. The 766th Independent Unit was still leading the attack, PsW reveal, until the division reached the approaches to SAMCHOK (37°26'N-129°10'E). Here the former reportedly joined other elements of its parent organization which a few days earlier had made an amphibious landing near that town. This combined unit ostensibly proceeded into the hills, from where the troops, after changing into civilian clothes, infiltrated into SAMCHOK in order to gather intelligence to be transmitted by radio to the advancing 5th Division. The 10th Regiment, after some small skirmishes with ROK troops, allegedly entered SAMCHOK on or about 5 July; most of these ROK troops appear to have been stragglers who, according to enemy prisoner, were quite active in making small-scale raids during the night and inflicting minor casualties. During this time the 12th Regiment was reportedly scattered along the coast mopping up isolated UN troops who were hiding in the hills. The division departed SAMCHOK on 7 July, according to available evidence, and reached UTCHIN (37°00'N-129°24'E) on the morning of the 9th. The 10th Regiment was in the lead followed by elements of the 12th Regiment. The 766th Unit was still spearheading the attack and fragmentary reports indicate

(5) TIS 36, 619, 903.

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that this unit fought a large-scale engagement at UTCHIN in which the 5th Division was not committed. The 11th Regiment, which was fighting in CHUNYANG at that time, apparently became engaged with UN forces retreating from UTCHIN, for numerous reports indicate that the ROK units encountered in that battle were withdrawing from the coast. After taking CHUNYANG the 11th Regiment purportedly proceeded toward the coast and rejoined the division at UTCHIN on or about 11 July. The 766th Unit, after undergoing a reorganization of undetermined scope at UTCHIN, is reported to have proceeded westward into the mountains with the mission of infiltrating in small units to PUSAN. Leaving this unit behind, the 5th Division continued its drive south with the 10th Regiment leading the attack; the 11th followed closely behind, interrogation reports reveal, and the 12th Regiment minus one battalion brought up the rear. Opposed only by small-scale delaying actions, the division arrived at P'YONGHAE-RI (36°44'N-129°26'E) on or about 13 July. Here the division purportedly split its forces again; this time the 10th Regiment separated from the main body and marched westward through the mountains in the direction of CHINBO (36°32'N-129°02'E). (6)

From the beginning of hostilities up to this time the division was mainly engaged in mopping-up operations and guarding areas along the coast. Although actual battle casualties were slight, considerable losses in manpower are said to have been sustained due mainly to sore feet and exhaustion caused by the long-forced marches over extremely rough terrain. Numerous cases of malaria have also been reported, for which the troops received a camphor injection of Japanese manufacture, as well as the usual atabrine and quinine tablets. The total division casualties up to that time have been estimated by PsW at approximately 1,800 men, most of which were sustained by the 11th Regiment. During the southward drive, two meals per day were eaten whenever possible, 5th Division prisoners contend. Rice was cooked in large kettles by each company mess section and mixed with wheat, millet and pickles; this monotonous diet was supplemented by a hot bowl of soup whenever possible. In addition, each soldier was reportedly issued a one-day emergency ration consisting of rice, dried fish and seaweed. Although supplies were still coming through every day, PsW assert that constant air attacks and naval bombardment were beginning to cause shortages and restrict their movement to the hours of darkness. (7)

When on 13 July the 10th Regiment swung west at P'YONGHAE-RI, the rest of the division is reported to have continued south fighting every inch of the way against ROK rear guard action; as a consequence, the division made slow progress. At the outskirts of YONGHAE (36°32'N-129°24'E), which was reached on the afternoon of 14 July, the division was allegedly held up by heavy artillery and mortar fire. During the night the 11th Regiment tried to infiltrate through the ROK positions

(6) TIS 101, 239, 632.
(7) TIS 620, 1172, 1548.

UNCLASSIFIED

but after a savage fight was repulsed and forced to withdraw. The following day, however, the 11th and 12th Regiments in a combined assault forced their way through the UN positions, reports indicate, and by 1400 hours the town was in their hands; but their success was short-lived, for after a fierce counterattack lasting all afternoon ROK troops re-occupied the southern section of town. On the morning of 16 July the 5th Division, after another all-out attack, finally secured the town and pursued the withdrawing UN defenders. Veterans of the operations on the east coast relate that the 5th Division in two weeks of heavy battles forged its way ahead toward YONGDOK (36°24'N-129°22'E) and finally captured the town on or about 3 August after sustaining prohibitive casualties. During the seige the 10th Regiment allegedly pressed the attack from the west and fought its way into the outskirts two or three times, but was forced to withdraw each time under withering artillery and small-arms fire. In its drive on YONGDOK the division is said to have been subjected to almost constant bombardment from UN aircraft and naval vessels; even at night the troops were apparently not given any respite, for prisoners complain that our artillery opened up with heavy fire after the naval and air attacks ceased. To illustrate the terrific casualties that the division sustained in these battles, one PW relates that in a single naval barrage 700 men were killed and huge stores of supplies and equipment were destroyed. Altogether the 5th Division is estimated to have suffered a 40% reduction in strength in the battle for YONGDOK. (8)

For the next few days the division remained in YONGDOK to reorganize and receive replacements. Approximately 1,200 new men were reportedly assigned to the three infantry regiments, bringing them up to about 50% of strength. These replacements were all North Koreans with about three weeks training who had been marching for fully 15 days before joining the division. Early on 6 August the troops departed YONGDOK and, fighting against stubborn resistance, assaulted and captured CHANGSA-DONG (36°16'N-129°22'E) on about 8 August, according to available information. Continuing south, the division reportedly battled its way through CHONGHA (36°12'N-129°20'E) and HUNGHAE (36°06'N-129°20'E) under constant harassment by naval fire and air attacks and arrived on the outskirts of POHANG-DONG (36°02'N-129°22'E) on 18 August. During this period the almost continuous air attacks on supply routes and lines of communication and the highly successful harassing and interdictory fire of UN naval contingents apparently began to show their effect on the supply system of the 5th Division, for many reports show that units were sometimes forced to live off the land for several days at a time when rations failed to arrive. To boost their morale in the face of adverse supply conditions and heavy battle losses, the troops were allegedly told that the war would soon be over and that the UN forces, after the capture of TAEGU (35°52'N-128°36'E), would be driven into the sea. After a two-day artillery barrage the division purportedly attacked POHANG-DONG

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(8) TIS 284, 604, 1545.

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with all three regiments committed and occupied the town on 20 August after a fierce engagement that resulted in heavy casualties, most of which were caused by intense artillery fire. While in the city the troops are reported to have been subjected to constant air and artillery bombardment. On about 23 August, American and ROK troops launched a counterattack, PsW claim, which forced the division to withdraw about 5 miles to the north. In the confusion of the retreat the troops became so disorganized, it is alleged, that it took several hours to reorganize them. In the course of this engagement the division allegedly received such heavy casualties that its strength was reduced to about 4,000 men. From 23 August to 3 September the division reportedly remained in defensive positions just north of POHANG-DONG. During this period approximately 3,000 replacements were received, most of whom were conscripted south of the 38th Parallel and assigned to the division without any previous military training. Because of the general shortage of weapons, many of these men were only issued grenades and instructed to pick up the rifles of their comrades as they fell on the battlefield. On 3 September the division purportedly resumed its attack with the objective of taking POHANG-DONG and the airfield south of the town. By the following day the North Koreans succeeded in breaking through the outer defenses of UN forces and fighting fanatically through a hail of artillery and small-arms fire they finally entered the town on 6 September; but before they could consolidate their gains the UN forces counterattacked and once again forced the division to withdraw. After taking up defensive positions just north of the city the 5th Division reportedly began probing for a weak spot in UN defenses. The enemy remained in this position for several days, fighting an artillery duel and sending out combat patrols. Interrogation reports reveal that late in the evening of the 11th the division advanced toward the southwest, skirting the outer fringes of the UN defenses, and deployed along the high ground overlooking POHANG-DONG for another assault on the town. The 11th and 12th Regiments were poised for an attack from the west, while the 10th Regiment occupied assault positions approximately 2½ miles southwest of POHANG-DONG. During the night large amounts of ammunition were allegedly carried to gun positions and last-minute preparations were made. On 12 September, UN forces began laying a heavy artillery concentration on positions held by the 10th Regiment and later in the day the 11th and 12th Regiments were likewise engaged by artillery. Soon after that all three regiments were attacked heavily by UN aircraft which wrought considerable damage and disrupted all plans for the attack. The devastating artillery barrage is reported to have continued day and night for several days, forcing the North Koreans to remain in their foxholes. (9)

An ROK amphibious force of about company strength ostensibly effected a landing on about 14 September in the vicinity of CHONGHA. One battalion from the 12th Regiment, which was dispatched to dislodge this force,

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(9) TIS 1257, 1548, 1611.

is reported to have reached the landing site late that same evening and promptly engaged the raiders who had taken up positions in the coastal hills. In the meantime the rest of the division was purportedly ordered to withdraw from their heavily-shelled positions and to regroup in the vicinity of CHONGHA. When the last elements had withdrawn to the assembly area on 16 September, the division was deployed along the Tosong-Dong (36°08'N-129°16'E) - Chongha road in well dug-in positions designed primarily to afford protection against the dreaded air attacks which only the day before had blown up the entire ammunition dump of the division artillery. Since the division had been reduced to approximately 50% of its original strength by this time, it remained in this locality reorganizing and receiving replacements totalling about 1,200 men. On 21 September 1950, enemy prisoners reveal, the 5th Division was hit by the full weight of the all-out UN offensive launched in coordination with the successful amphibious operation at INCHON (37°28'N-126°38'E). The 10th Regiment, which apparently bore the brunt of the attack, is said to have been overrun and surrounded after about one hour of fierce fighting. As a result, on 22 September elements of the routed division withdrew in utter disorder to YONGDOK, it is reported, where they were once more taken under heavy fire by UN naval vessels. Under orders to withdraw farther north the division left YONGDOK on about 24 September with a remaining strength of about 2,400 men. Marching in groups of platoon size and maintaining intervals of about 5 miles between regiments during daytime, the division retraced its route of advance along the coast and, according to available reports, arrived at ANBYON (39°02'N-127°32'E) on about 3 November. While retreating, the division became embroiled several times in small guerrilla actions but successfully evaded larger UN forces. Several bands of stragglers are said to have joined the column en route, boosting its strength to approximately 3,000 men. Rations were apparently confiscated from local farmers who were forced to provide the necessary transportation to haul the food to the troops.

Continuing its retreat, the division allegedly arrived in CHONGP'YONG (39°48'N-127°22'E) on 8 November and, after joining forces with remnants of the 2d Division, appears to have proceeded through HAMHUNG (39°54'N-127°32'E), where it swung inland, finally proceeding north along a road that parallels the TAEDONG River. On 18 November elements of the badly-decimated 5th Division, with a remaining strength of only 500 troops, were seen passing through SACHANG-NI (40°06'N-126°56'E) moving in a northerly direction. Interrogation reports dating from this period paint a vivid picture of the complete defeat suffered by the North Korean enemy; the 5th Division, these reports indicate, had lost or abandoned all heavy supporting weapons and less than half of the demoralized troops were armed. Only by threats of on-the-spot execution and by dealing severely with any attempts to desert were the officers able to retain a semblance of organization among their men. Although there are only a few reports of the 5th Division's movements after it left SACHANG-NI, and those reports are based on hearsay information, it appears likely that the division proceeded to the Kanggye (40°58'N-126°36'E) Area to be reorganized, retrained and re-equipped,

for a PW claims to have overheard a major from the 5th Division name that town as his unit's destination. Moreover, another report dating from November asserts that the 5th, 6th and 12th Divisions became part of the V North Korean Corps, which established its headquarters in KANGGYE. The history of the reconstituted 5th Division after it left the Kanggye Area becomes hazy because of a lack of accurate and authentic reports; in fact, the division has only been mentioned three times after that date by prisoners from other units whose information is necessarily limited and inconclusive. (10)

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(10) TIS 1549, 1630, 1956, 2265, 2311, 2377, 2483, 2772, 3104, 3107, 3151.

The following additional sources were utilized in the preparation of this report:

TIS 39, 79, 105, 126, 409, 444, 446, 605, 630, 633, 680, 740, 843, 896, 891, 1083, 1140, 1144, 1154, 1185, 1188, 1206, 1207, 1220, 1254, 1269, 1510, 1512, 1523, 1629, 1630, 2012, 2238, 3146.

PLATE 3

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN
5TH INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD JULY 1949 - 21 SEPTEMBER 1950

LOCALE NO.	PAGE NO.	LOCALE	REMARKS
1	37	NANAM (41°42'N-129°41'E)	Home station of the 5th Div from Jul 49 to Jun 50
2	38	YANGYANG (38°04'N-128°38'E)	5th Div assembly area from 23 to 25 Jun 50
3	39	CHUMUNJIN (37°54'N-128°50'E)	Leading elements of the division entered the town on 25 Jun
4	39	KANGNUNG (37°44'N-128°54'E)	The 11th Regt separated from the division on 26 Jun
5	40	UTCHIN (37°00'N-129°24'E)	Occupied by the 5th Div on 9 Jul. The 11th Regt rejoined the division here on 11 Jul
6	41	PYONGHAE-RI (36°44'N-129°26'E)	The 10th Regt separated from the division on 13 Jul
7	41	YONGHAE (36°32'N-129°24'E)	Battle for YONGHAE 14 to 16 Jul
8	42	YONGDOK (36°24'N-129°22'E)	Occupied by the 5th Div on 3 Aug
9	42	POHANG-DONG (36°02'N-129°22'E)	Battle for POHANG-DONG from 18 Aug to 15 Sep
10	44	TOSONG-DONG (36°08'N-129°16'E)	Last defensive stand from 16 to 21 Sep prior to full retreat


124°
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131°
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39°
SSUPINGCHIEH
HSIAN
HAIFENG
KAIYUAN
TIEHLING
HAILUNG
CHINCHAUN
MENGCHIANG
FUSHUN
MUKDEN
PENGHIU
TUNGHUA
LINCHIANG
CHASONG
HUCHANG
SINGALPAJIN
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PYORHARI
KYOLMULLI
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SANGNI
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SAJIDONG
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KRASKINO
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ANTUNG
SINUIJU
PYOKTONG
CHANGJU
PUNGLANG
KOINDONG
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YONGGANG
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



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ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS
OF NK 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD JULY 1949-
21 SEPTEMBER 1950



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PLATE 4

ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS OF NORTH KOREAN
5TH INFANTRY DIVISION
PERIOD 21 SEPTEMBER 1950 - NOVEMBER 1950

LOCALE NO.	PAGE NO.	LOCALE	REMARKS
1	44	TOSONG-DONG (36°08'N-129°16'E)	Last defensive stand from 16 to 21 Sep prior to full retreat. Retreat north began 21 Sep
2	44	ANBYON (39°02'N-127°32'E)	Division retreated through this town on 3 Nov
3	44	CHONGP'YONG (39°48'N-127°22'E)	Retreating 5th Div joined forces with remnants of 2d Div on 8 Nov
4	44	SACHANG-NI (40°06'N-126°56'E)	Decimated 5th Div passed through this town on 18 Nov
5	45	KANGGYE (40°58'N-126°36'E)	Possible reorganization and retraining area of 5th Div

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

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

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

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ROUTE AND MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS OF NK 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION PERIOD 21 SEPTEMBER 1950-NOVEMBER 1950

PLATE 4

PDM MAP NO 5 REVISED 7 JULY 48

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